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ABSTRACT 
Although established to promote economic integration in West Africa, ECOWAS has 
transformed into a regional security organization concerned with terminating conflicts in the 
sub-region. Accordingly, ECOWAS has militarily intervened in the numerous conflicts in the 
sub-region including the Liberian and Ivorian civil wars. The study notes that the fundamental 
causes of conflicts in the sub-region have not changed, although their dynamics have changed 
in many ways. Similarly, the approach of member states towards conflict resolution has 
changed remarkably with time, evidenced by the easing of the Anglo-Francophone tensions 
within the community. However, ECOWAS faces challenges in its conflict management role, 
including financial and logistical constraints, lack of consensus on the deployment of 
ECOMOG, lack of neutrality in peacekeeping operations, and its heavy reliance on Nigeria’s 
leadership in interventions. These and other impediments have vitiated ECOWAS’s capacity 
to swiftly intervene in conflict situations. The study concludes that, overcoming the challenges 
confronting it increases the capacity of ECOWAS to manage conflicts in the region. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
         ECOWAS Member States 
         Non-ECOWAS Member States 
Figure 1.1 shows the geographical map of West Africa (source: http://www.tdrp.net/ECOWAS.php 
accessed: 28/05/2019) 
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1.1 Background to the study 
Post-colonial Africa was confronted with socio-economic, political and cultural hurdles 
emanating from the legacies of imperialism. With states lacking the capacity to champion 
economic transformation and development, multi-lateral cooperation, promoted through the 
formation of regional economic groupings became a viable alternative approach to dealing with 
the problems of development in Africa. Initial efforts at promoting ‘Third World regional 
integration’ were unsuccessful, largely due to the inability of developing countries to sacrifice 
their national interest ‘on the altar of regionalism’ (Okolo, 1985: 2). It was within this context 
that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established. 
Prior to the formation of ECOWAS, the collective land mass referred to as West Africa was 
comprised of an amalgamation of 16 independent states, with each country having a unique 
colonial experience which subsequently defined the borders of the region (ECOWAS, 2016). 
The diversity within West Africa is evidenced by the hundreds of local languages spoken across 
the region. This is in addition to the official languages imposed by the colonizers- English, 
French and Portuguese (ibid). This, however, did not deter West African states from embarking 
on the ambitious project of regional integration.  
In view of this, the 1975 Treaty of Lagos, signed by 16 West African States resulted in the 
creation of ECOWAS, with the aim of integrating countries within the sub-region (Atuobi, 
2010). With several commonalities in history and culture, such an undertaking was not only 
possible but also prudent. The bloc was geared towards promoting interstate economic and 
political cooperation. This in effect, was aimed at accelerating the economic and social 
development of member states (ECOWAS, 2018). The organization was also established with 
the view of enhancing cultural and social cooperation among member states. Also, the pioneers 
of ECOWAS sought to increase and maintain economic stability in West Africa, as a strategic 
approach towards contributing to the ‘progress and development of the African continent’ 
(Lagos Treaty, 1975: 2).  
The founding fathers of the organization were however oblivious of the interconnectedness of 
peace and development. Hence, the treaty did not envision a role for ECOWAS in the 
maintenance of regional peace and security. Neither did it make provision for mitigating 
potential interstate and intrastate conflicts. Sooner than expected, interstate disputes prevalent 
within the community, as well as the resurgence of external threats, culminated in the adoption 
of two security related protocols- the Protocol on Non- Aggression (1978) and the Protocol on 
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Mutual Assistance and Defense (1981) (Ekiyor, 2008). This marked a digression in the 
trajectory of the organization.   
However, the post-cold war era changed the dynamics of conflicts on the African continent 
(Adeniji, 1997). It was within this epoch that the organization came to the realization that its 
objective of promoting economic integration would be unattainable considering the surge in 
violent intrastate conflicts within member states. In the 1990’s, scholars portrayed the sub-
region as emerging into a new theatre of violent civil wars in Africa (Francis, 2017). In his 
famous article, ‘The Coming Anarchy’, Robert D. Kaplan describes the situation in West Africa 
in a rather horrendous manner, asserting that the sub-region was evolving into a ‘symbol of 
worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress’ (Kaplan, 1994: 3). Although the 
postulation of Kaplan and other ‘dooms day’ scholars was an exaggeration of the reality, yet it 
portrayed to some extent the level of degeneration of security in the sub-region, as evidenced 
in the crisis in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.  
These internal conflicts not only posed a threat to countries within the community but also to 
regional peace and security (Adebajo, 2002). As such, as a way of safeguarding its initial goal 
of economic integration, ECOWAS assumed the role of a vibrant security actor in the sub-
region through its first military intervention in the Liberian civil war. The intervention in 
Liberia significantly influenced ECOWAS’ conception of security in West Africa. At the onset 
of the mayhem, the sub-regional body anticipated a firm response from the international 
community (Kennedy, 2018). This however turned-out to be an illusion. The bold decision 
taken by ECOWAS to intervene in the civil war therefore marked a paradigm shift from the 
universally accepted Westphalia model of international relations which upholds the principles 
of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states (Osiander, 2001). 
Nonetheless, the organization was able to stabilize the turbulence in Liberia amidst the many 
challenges it encountered.  
During this period, the bloc recognized the need for institutional reform to enhance its capacity 
to deal with the emerging political and security challenges it was confronted with. 
Subsequently, despite the initial silence of the Lagos Treaty on security related matters, the 
ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 contained provisions that rendered the organization 
responsible for the maintenance of regional peace and stability. Article 58(2) of the treaty states 
“… Member States undertake to co-operate with the Community in establishing and 
strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-State 
13 
 
and inter-State conflicts… in a bid to consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of 
peace, stability and security within the region”. (ECOWAS, 1993). Member states of the 
community went on to adopt the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security in 1999 (Atuobi, 2010). This protocol 
forms the framework which underpins the regional organizations peace and security 
engagements. Currently, ECOWAS has a well institutionalized and robust conflict 
management framework.  
Notwithstanding efforts of the bloc at ensuring human security, the 2010 Ivorian elections 
resulted in another round of hostilities (Novosseloff, 2018). Although wearied by the many 
conflicts it had intervened in prior to this period, ECOWAS played an active role in resolving 
the conflict. With well-established institutional structures, the approach of ECOWAS towards 
the second Ivorian civil war varied from its earlier intervention in Liberia.   
Generally, there exist two schools of thoughts with regards to the capacity of ECOWAS to 
prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the region. Whereas some scholars contend that the 
regional organization has failed, perhaps almost completely in resolving the many security 
challenges the sub-region is confronted with, other scholars posit that the organization has been 
successful in managing conflicts within the sub-region despite the many challenges (Adebajo, 
2002 ; Ani & Amusan, 2016; Gberie, 2003). Proponents of the former view assert that, by 
focusing on its initial vision of promoting economic integration, ECOWAS can prevent the 
occurrence of conflicts. This thesis is however aligned with the later school of thought.  In view 
of this stance, the study will be concerned with analysing the challenges encountered by 
ECOWAS in its interventions.  
1.2 Research Questions 
The research seeks to answer the following questions: 
1. What challenges stifled ECOWAS’ conflict management strategies in the Liberian (1990) 
and Ivorian crisis (2010)? 
2. What contributions did the institutionalization of the ECOWAS security architecture make 
on the organizations conflict management in Cote d’Ivoire? 
3. Were there any similarities or discrepancies in the challenges encountered by ECOWAS in 
both conflicts?  
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1.3 Statement of The Problem 
Conflict prevention, management and resolution has emerged as a crucial component of 
ECOWAS’ vision of promoting socio-economic development in West Africa (Mareike, 2015). 
With time, the regional bloc has undertaken several diplomatic and military interventions in 
the sub-region including  in Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea Bissau (1998), Cote 
d’Ivoire (2002) Togo (2005), Cote d’Ivoire (2010), Guinea-Bissau (2012), Mali (2013), and 
Gambia (2017) (Africa, 2018). Although the region has been relatively stable since the 
beginning of the 21st century, ECOWAS’ contribution towards this has not been without 
challenges. The recent upsurge in insurgencies and the undue interference of the military in 
politics in Guinea-Bissau, Gambia and Mali have necessitated the need for a tentative research 
to be carried out in appraising the challenges crippling the efforts of ECOWAS in managing 
conflicts in the sub-region. The study will therefore be focused on the challenges faced by 
ECOWAS in resolving the sub-regions first post-cold war conflict in Liberia as well as the 
region’s first post-election conflict in Cote d’Ivoire.   
The Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was executed under very strained 
conditions both within Liberia and among member states of the community (Arowolo, 2015). 
Nothing within the history of ECOWAS had prepared the organization for its new role, hence, 
the intervention was stifled by many challenges (Adeleke, 1995). Although some of the 
challenges encountered were as a result of the unintended effects of the actions and inactions 
of the organization, yet, most of these challenges occurred due to the experimental nature of 
the intervention. Similarly, the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire was fraught with many challenges. 
However, unlike the intervention in Monrovia which merited little concern from the 
international community, the conflict in Yamoussoukro gained the attention of several 
international actors (Abatan, 2016). 
Although ECOWAS was actively involved in resolving both conflicts, the conflicts occurred 
within different context. The Ivorian crisis occurred twenty years after the ECOWAS 
intervention in Liberia. Again, the intervention in Liberia occurred in the absence of a well 
institutionalized conflict management framework by the organization. Contrary to this, the 
intervention in Ivory Coast occurred within a period where the organization had properly laid-
out structures and institutions which guided the bloc’s efforts in stabilizing the country. As 
such, the research aims at ascertaining the impediments ECOWAS has been confronted with 
overtime in its conflict management. The study revolves around the core argument that 
ECOWAS is capable of managing conflicts within West Africa. Howbeit, the organizations 
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conflict management is plagued by many challenges most of which keep recurring in all its 
interventions.  
1.4 Objectives of the study 
The research seeks to: 
1. Examine the challenges faced by ECOWAS in its interventions in Liberia and Cote 
d’Ivoire. 
2. Find out the impact of institutional structures established after the Liberian civil war 
on the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire. 
3. Ascertain the similarities and discrepancies in challenges faced by ECOWAS in both 
conflicts.  
4. Make recommendations on how ECOWAS can improve on its conflict management 
in West Africa.  
1.5 Significance  
With the prioritization of peace and security by ECOWAS, there is the need for the bloc to 
develop a strong capacity to stabilize the sub-region. It is therefore relevant for the intervention 
of ECOWAS in past conflicts to be reassessed in a manner that emphasizes on the challenges 
faced by the organization and how best these challenges can be resolved. This research will 
therefore contribute towards aiding policy formulation in ECOWAS by illuminating the 
deficiencies in the organizations conflict management. Although the ECOWAS intervention in 
Liberia has been widely studied by academics, there has been little focus in the literature on 
the Ivorian intervention and the unique challenges that ECOWAS has been confronted with 
overtime. As such, this thesis will contribute significantly towards bringing a new perspective 
to understanding ECOWAS’ conflict management capability by evaluating the challenges that 
occurred prior to the adoption of institutional structures by the organization vis-à-vis challenges 
occurring afterwards. The research will also add up to the existing literature on peace and 
security in West Africa. 
1.6 Methodology 
Qualitative methodology of research was employed in undertaking this study. Qualitative 
research as a methodological approach to understanding a phenomenon comprises different 
approaches. In order to expound the research questions, the case study method has been 
adopted for this thesis. As such, both primary and secondary data will be used. Primary data 
sourced for the purpose of the research includes all ECOWAS protocols, treaties, declarations 
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and frameworks relevant to the study. Secondary data sourced for the study includes books, 
academic journals, articles, publications by civil society organizations, occasional papers, and 
international news outlets. The research will also focus on ECOWAS’ interventions in Liberia 
and Cote d’Ivoire as case studies. The parameters for analysing the case study will include: the 
motivations for the intervention, the conflict management approach adopted by ECOWAS and 
the challenges emanating thereof. 
1.7 Limitations 
 Due to the focus of the study, the research will not address in detail the role of other national 
and international actors in resolving the conflicts. Another limitation to the research is in 
relation to the limited availability of literature that comprehensively analyse the ECOWAS 
intervention in Cote d’Ivoire. The study is also limited as it focuses primarily on ECOWAS’ 
interventions in two armed conflicts, hence neglecting the challenges encountered by the 
regional group in other areas of peace and security in the sub-region. This renders a 
generalization of the findings of the study difficult.  
1.8 Scope of the study 
The research is limited to the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia from August 1990 until 1997 
and the post-election crisis in Ivory Coast from November 2010 until April 2011.  
1.9 Arrangement of chapters  
In order to examine the research questions, the thesis has been streamlined into six distinct but 
interrelated chapters. Chapter one explains the background to the study as well as the 
methodology to be used in gathering the data. The chapter also ascertains the objectives of the 
study, its significance to literature as well as the limitations of the study. The second chapter 
examines the conceptual framework underpinning the study. Concepts discussed includes 
conflict, security regionalism and conflict management. Chapter three critically analyses the 
institutionalization of conflict management in West Africa, spanning from peace and security 
related protocols, treaties and frameworks adopted from 1978 until 2008. This will provide a 
good basis for understanding the ECOWAS interventions as well as the challenges encountered 
by the regional organization. Chapter four sheds light on the historical antecedent as well as 
the circumstances precipitating the occurrence of the Liberian civil war. The chapter will also 
analyse the rationale behind ECOWAS’ intervention, the legality of the intervention as well as 
challenges that impeded the organizations efficiency in terms of its military and diplomatic 
approaches. The fifth chapter traces the causes of the Ivorian civil war and explains the role of 
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external actors in the conflict. The chapter also evaluates why ECOWAS could not intervene 
militarily in the conflict and the challenges it encountered. Chapter six ties together all the 
issues discussed in the study and highlights some similarities and differences in the challenges 
encountered by the organization.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
There exists a wide array of academic literature on conflicts in Africa and particularly 
challenges encountered by sub-regional organizations in their pursuit of peace and stability. 
This chapter, however, focuses on exploring concepts relating to conflict management. As 
such, the four sections of the chapter will explain the following: conflict, drivers of conflict in 
Africa, security regionalism and conflict management. These concepts will form the basis for 
understanding the subsequent chapters of this thesis.   
2.2 CONFLICT 
Conflict is a common phenomenon in every human society. Throughout the history of 
humanity, conflicts have been employed as a tool for expressing people’s dissatisfaction with 
prevailing social, economic, cultural and political systems. As such, the eruption of armed 
conflict within a state is an exemplification of the pursuit of divergent views and interest among 
various state and non-state actors (Kazanský, 2015). The irreconcilable disagreements that 
usually results in conflicts are of varying forms and may include social, economic, political, 
historical, cultural or ethnic discrepancies (Akpokpari, 2008). 
Although scholars generally agree on the need to define conflict, yet, like other ambivalent 
concepts in the social sciences, it is seemingly impossible to have a universally accepted 
definition of the term (Melander, 2015). However, for the purpose of this thesis, some 
definitions of conflict will be explored.  According to Lewis Coser, conflict can be defined as 
the “struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of 
the conflict groups are not only to gain the desired values, but also to neutralize, injure, or 
eliminate rivalry” (Oberschall, 1978: 291). In their view, Hocker and Wilmot perceive conflict 
as “an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive 
incompatible goals, scarce rewards, and interference from the other party as hindering the 
attainment of goals” (Nwosu, 2014: 31). Further, Krejčí explains conflict as “ a situation, in 
which a certain group (tribe, ethnic group, ideological group or state)… is in a purposeful 
dispute with one or more groups…” (Kazanský, 2015: 3). 
On his part, Bernard Mayer explains conflict using a three dimensional approach (Annan, 
2014). With regards to this, conflict can be ascertained in terms of perception, feeling or action. 
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With reference to the perception dimension of conflict, Mayer postulates that conflict emanates 
from a firmly held belief that a groups interest, values, goals, and needs are antipathetic to that 
of others (ibid). This perception is usually translated into feelings expressed through a myriad 
of emotions such as ‘fear, anger, bitterness, sadness, hopelessness and frustration’ which 
culminates in conflicts. Due to people’s perceptions and feelings, they take action which could 
be violent and destructive in nature (Mayer, 2000: 2).   
Further, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) (2008) explains conflict in 
terms of   “the contradictions inherent in power relations and which manifest themselves in 
individual and group interactions with one another and with nature in the pursuit of limited 
resources or opportunities” (Ecowas, 2013: 10). As such, the framework perceives conflict as 
being a viable motor for transformation which may either have a positive or negative outcome. 
In view of this, conflicts can be creatively channelled to ensure “ equity, progress and harmony 
or destructively transformed to engender acute insecurity” (ibid:10). That notwithstanding, 
most conflicts occuring in the world are violent and destructive.  
It is, however, important for the purposes of this thesis for armed conflicts to be put into 
perspective. Armed conflict is defined in International Humanitarian Law as any conflict “ 
which take place in the territory of a state, between its armed forces and dissident armed forces 
or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control 
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations” (ICRC, 2008). In view of this definition, a conflict situation may be classified as 
armed conflict provided belligerents to the war includes one or more non-state actors. 
Similarly, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program defines armed conflict as “a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory, where the use of armed force 
between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (Melander, 2015:3).  
From the above definitions, a common denominator that characterizes conflicts is the escalation 
of tension between groups. These tensions are birthed out of the unhealthy competition for 
power over state resources, contrasting values and the desire of a group of people to express 
their griviances and frustration through combat. It is therefore as a result of the incompatibility 
of these goals as well as the impossibility of achieving them concurrently that conflicts occur.   
Armed conflicts can broadly be classified as either intra-state or inter state (Bugajski, 2011). 
Intra-state or domestic conflicts occurs within a state and usually has two or more warring 
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factions. Although, intra-state conflicts occur within the frontiers of the state, they have the 
capacity to spillover into neighbouring states. Very often, such conflicts are caused by 
deepening political divisions, high levels of inequality within a state and the failure of the state 
to meet its basic obligation of protecting its citizens (Kazanský, 2015). Compared to the other 
forms of conflicts, intra-state conflicts have been prevalent in Africa since the end of the cold 
war. As such, the international community has been preoccupied with finding solutions to these 
conflicts, due to the threat they pose to global peace and security. Consequently, this has 
resulted in a rise in interventionsit policies at both the global, regional and sub-regional levels 
(ibid). These conflicts are manifested through civil wars, ethnic conflicts and insurgency 
among others. Examples of such conflicts include the war in Somalia (2006-2009) and Burundi 
(1993-2005) (ibid). Interstate conflicts on the contrary occur as a result of contentions between 
states.  (Oberschall, 1978). Examples include the Ethiopia- Eritrea war (1998-2000) and the 
Cameroon-Nigeria conflict (1977). These conflicts are usually underpinned by border disputes. 
However, inter-state conflicts have been declining since the end of the cold war. 
2.3 Drivers of Conflicts in West Africa 
Different reasons have been alluded in explaining the sources of instability in West Africa 
ranging from the domino effect of colonialism to the neo-patriarchal nature of politics in the 
region (Aremu, 2010). That notwithstanding, none of the individual causal factors can 
sufficiently and exhaustively explain the basis for conflicts in the sub-region. The complexity 
of conflicts in West Africa makes it impossible for a ‘single analytical approach’ to be adopted 
in explaining the roots of conflicts (Akpokpari, 2008). Moreover, it is seemingly impossible to 
come up with a clear-cut typology of conflicts in West Africa, partly due to the “multi-causal, 
multi-dimensional and inter-connected nature of most conflicts” within the sub-region (Omeje, 
2010). Jackson (2008) argues that the underpinnings of bloodbath and terror in Africa is not 
wholly as a result of ethnicity or some irrational factors “but the usual suspects that fuel conflict 
and violence throughout the world - political and economic competition, the failings of 
government, the decision of oppressed communities to take matters into their own hands, and 
the meddling and self-interested stratagems of external powers” (Jackson, 2008). Yet, other 
scholars ascribe the causes of conflicts in the sub-region to competition for scarce natural 
resources (Alao, 2007).  
Although conflicts are not always vicious, most of those experienced in West Africa are 
characterized by extreme savagery. The ramifications of these conflicts include refugee crisis, 
destruction of human life and properties, stifling of economic growth and development  as well 
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as the destabilization of  existing institutions of governance within the sub-region (Annan, 
2014). Annan (2014) explains violent conflicts in the sub-region as emanating from either 
unconstitutional take-over of power by the military or insurrection. Although military coup 
d’états are often short-lived in the sub-region, however, insurrections have usually been 
prolonged and have had devastating effects.  
The ECPF explains the factors that precipitate conflicts in terms of structural factors, 
accelerators and triggers (ECOWAS, 2013). The framework postulates that, the alteration of 
structural elements through the aggravation of conflict accelerators is the fundamental cause of 
human insecurity. By structural factors, the ECPF implies systemic variables influenced by 
several decades if not centuries of the sub-regions power relations with other entities at both 
the international, regional and local levels (ECOWAS, 2013). Other structural factors 
precipitating conflicts within the sub-region pertains to ‘the fault-lines in the architecture of 
the post-colonial African state’ and the vulnerability of the sub-region and the African 
continent to changes in the global system (ibid:10). Although a direct causal correlation may 
be difficult to establish between these factors and conflicts in West Africa, structural factors 
underpins some basic causes of conflicts such as poverty and economic inequalities within the 
sub-region. Conflict accelerators on the other hand pertains to the events and processes that 
continuously exacerbates the effects of structural factors. These include inter alia, the 
infringements of human rights, corruption, marginalization of minority groups and the 
oppressive use of a country’s security machinery. Triggers on the other hand are unexpected 
events with the capacity to ignite accelerators which subsequently results in violent conflicts 
(ibid).   
According to the UN Security Council’s Special Report (2011), despite significant progress 
made in ensuring economic growth and the consolidation of peace in West Africa, the sub-
region continues to be strained by deficiencies in democratic governance (UNSC, 2011). 
Whereas the gains from efficient democratic governance could have contributed towards 
attenuating violence in the sub-region, however, democracy is usually leveraged as a tool by 
political elites to alienate sections of the populace. Consequently, such actions by the ruling 
elites in the sub-region results in violence with perpetrators defending their actions on the 
grounds of exclusion and bad governance (UNSC, 2011). A case in point is the bloodbath that 
emerged as a result of the November 2010 elections in Cote d’ Ivoire. Political elites in West 
Africa instrumentalise elections as a tool for reinforcing existing socio-economic challenges 
and ethnic tensions, hence plunging the already frail states within the community into violence.  
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Again, scholars assert that weak states in West Africa provide the impetus for conflicts in the 
region. The weakness of most states emanates from their inability to carefully deal with 
challenges arising from the creation of ‘artificial boundaries’ in Africa, hence, leading to the 
aggravation of ethnic tensions (Akpokpari, 2008:90). The British Cabinet Sub-Committee on 
Conflict Prevention in Africa asserts that, the collapse of states in West Africa rarely occurs 
unexpected, as state failure arises out of a long process “characterised by predatory government 
operating through coercion, corruption and personality politics to secure political power and 
control of resources” (Development, 2000). Most of the conflict-laden countries  in West Africa 
have experienced prolonged periods of poor governance, flagrant corruption, high levels of 
unemployment and aggrieved youths, poor economic management and the stifling of political 
opposition (Aremu, 2010). As such, the mismanagement of scarce state resources has resulted 
in underdevelopment and the weakening of state institutions (Annan, 2014). With most West 
African states lacking the capacity to provide basic social services and the inability of states to 
monopolize the usage of force within their jurisdiction, violent conflicts have become 
inevitable in the sub-region (Jackson, 2008).  Again, the flagrant disregard for human rights 
evidenced through the instrumentalization of state security agencies to molest political 
opponents and civilians, extrajudicial killings and the absence of rule of law influences 
conflicts within the sub-region (Bujra, 2002). 
2.4 SECURITY REGIONALISM 
The concept of security regionalism has been championed as a viable alternative approach to 
addressing global peace and security in the post-cold war era. Security regionalism refers to 
the marshalling of efforts and resources by regional entities to respond to common security 
challenges (Maiangwa, 2017). The UN Charter provides the framework that underpins the 
involvement of regional organizations in conflict management (ibid:105). Chapter VIII, Article 
52 of the charter states inter alia that the UN does not “prohibit the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such 
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of 
the United Nations” (UN, 2016).  
Towards the end of the 20th century, the US and the West disengaged their involvement in 
conflicts in some regions of the world. As such, it became imperative for regional organizations 
to assume the arduous task of generating solutions to security challenges and managing post-
cold war conflicts which were in ascendency in parts of the world, especially in Africa (Abatan, 
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2016). Regardless of the increasing demand for external intervention in conflicts, the UN and 
the US have been lax in taking complete responsibility for addressing regional crises, as they 
seek to propagate regional solutions to regional conflicts (Chuka, 2016).  
This emerging phenomenon has been ascribed to the increasing demand on the international 
community to be involved in conflict management. Perhaps, this is as a result of the unending 
nature of conflicts in some regions in the world. Due to the enormity of these conflicts, UN 
troops dispatched to countries such as Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and Bosnia were adversely 
constrained. Hence, resulting in a ‘string of failures and humiliation’ (ICRC, 2008). 
Particularly, the fiasco in the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia in October 1993 resulted 
in the alteration of Western approach to conflicts in Africa (Chuka, 2016). The large-scale 
nature of these deployments resulted in significant constraints in the operations in terms of 
financing, timing and personnel. These challenges stifled the ability of the United Nations to 
ensure prompt and efficacious intervention measures (ibid). Hence, bringing to light the 
limitations of the UN to effectively intervene in all conflicts threatening global peace and 
security. It is against this background that the involvement of regional organizations in conflicts 
has become necessary. 
Toward the end of the ideological antagonism between the two dominant global powers, there 
was an almost clear-cut delineation of the role of various actors in conflicts- especially between 
regional, sub-regional and international organizations (Rugumamu, 2002). Whereas the UN 
performed its traditional role of ‘deploying political missions and peace keeping operations’, 
regional and sub-regional organizations were much more involved in preventive diplomacy 
(ibid:5-6). This new approach to ensuring international peace made it necessary for regional 
and sub-regional organizations to take responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security 
within their jurisdiction, as a way of easing the ‘burden’ on the UN (Maiangwa, 2017). As 
such, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has adopted a selective approach towards conflict 
interventions. Significantly, this agenda is being championed by the US which is consistently 
seeking cooperation and burden sharing by all actors in the international community 
(ICRC,2008). In view of this, conflict resolution in Africa has first been the responsibility of 
the African Union (AU) and its sub-regional organizations rather than the international 
community. 
 Hwang (2006) explains security regionalism in terms of domestic, regional and extra regional 
levels. He postulates that the most serious security challenges in the Third World is usually at 
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the domestic level. Domestic conflicts usually have the potency of threatening regional peace 
and stability and usually attract the attention of the international community. This in turn results 
in external intervention in regional security crisis. As such, the success of security regionalism 
is dependent on the viability of individual states that make up regional groups. That 
notwithstanding, regional organizations contribute immensely towards peace and security at 
the domestic level. At the regional level, conflicts are usually addressed by member states of 
regional groupings in their bid to search for a collective regional identity that thrives on 
‘politico-security regionalism’ (Hwang, 2006).  This results in the evolution of a regional 
security structure that is not only material but also ideological. At the extra-regional level, the 
goal of security regionalism is to serve as a counter-balancing mechanism to address security 
concerns that emanates from beyond the region. As such, at this level, security regionalism 
seeks to protect member states from threats arising from external states and organizations.  
Further, Hettne (2008) argues that the end of the cold war and the consequent rise of 
globalization has resulted in a new world order that goes beyond national sovereignty. In this 
regard, solutions to security challenges must be found in transnational structures. In view of 
this, conflict management is gradually getting internationalized either at the regional or global 
level. With domestic crises posing a threat to regional security, the traditional dichotomy 
between the domestic and international has been blurred (Hettne, 2008). As such, human rights 
violations and internal security challenges that states are confronted with usually take on a 
global outlook as the international community gets concerned about the consequences of such 
threats on the international system be it at the regional or global level. Security regionalism is 
therefore crucial in the maintenance of regional and global peace.  
2.5 Conflict Management 
Conflict management comprises a range of actions designed purposely to enhance the 
prevention, alleviation and resolution of conflicts (Chuka, 2016). It also constitutes a variety 
of interventionist efforts towards mitigating the dire impact of ongoing conflicts (ibid). A 
quintessential challenge to regional conflict management is the inability of these organizations 
to independently carry out operations without the support and involvement of a ‘regional 
hegemon’ (Jimoh, 2014). Also, the prevalence of internal rivalries among member states of 
regional organizations adversely affects regional conflict management efforts (ibid). This does 
not only stifle attempts at managing conflicts but also numbs ‘attempts at a collective action 
by regional organizations’ (Chuka, 2016). Further, the lack of resources in terms of finance, 
troops and logistics impedes the effectiveness of regional organizations in conflict resolution. 
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Conflict management is premised on four fundamental concepts: peacekeeping, peacebuilding, 
peace-making and peace-enforcement. These will be the focus of the preceding sub-sections. 
2.5.1 Peace-making  
Peace-making as an instrument of conflict management involves the use of diplomacy in 
fostering dialogue among leaders of conflicting parties in an attempt to broker peace, through 
representative political institutions (Domke, G & Solon, J, 2018). Former UN Secretary 
General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali (1992), defines peace-making as an “action to bring hostile 
parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI 
of the Charter of the United Nations”. Diplomatic and judicial measures provided for peace-
making in the UN Charter includes inter alia, ‘negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration and judicial settlement’ (UN, 1945).  
Negotiations carried out as part of the peace-making process are usually undertaken by 
international statesmen such as heads of states, the UN Secretary General, envoys, 
governments, group of states or other diplomats representing the UN or a regional or sub-
regional organization. This process is geared towards promoting dialogue as a way of reaching 
a favourable consensus which will abrogate hostilities among warring factions. Peace-making 
may also be carried out by non-governmental groups (UN, 2008).  Although, peace-making is 
only applicable to ongoing conflicts, nonetheless, it does not require the use of force as it is 
premised on diplomatic dialogue (Adeleke, 1995). Such initiatives are usually implemented 
prior to the dispatching of a peace-keeping mission. Peace-making becomes necessary in 
conflicts characterized by a breach of international humanitarian law. With belligerents to these 
conflicts usually taking intransigent postures, there is the need for neutral external mediators 
to be involved in finding a political solution to such crisis (Ouellet, 2003). Also, peace-making 
efforts are usually aimed at achieving a peace agreement. This implies that a successful peace-
making initiative must include all parties to a conflict.   
2.5.2 Peacekeeping 
Peacekeeping operation (PKO) is an approach to conflict management employed to prevent 
conflicts from surging, in order to create a conducive environment for the political settlement 
of disagreements (UN, 2018). In his report, “An agenda for peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peace-making and Peacebuilding” the former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali  
defined peacekeeping as involving “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, 
hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations 
military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well” (Ghali, 1992:13). Patryk 
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Labuda (2015) further defines peacekeeping as “measures aimed at preventing a breach of the 
peace or maintaining and restoring peace, which are carried out with the authorization of the 
United Nations or other international or regional organizations” (Labuda, 2015). PKO’s 
therefore involve ‘the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities 
between or within states through the medium of third-party intervention, organized and directed 
internationally… to restore and maintain peace’ (International Peace Academy, 1984:7).  
 These operations are aimed at preserving peace no matter how frail as well as aiding in the 
implementation of agreements arrived at by peacemakers. Most international peacekeeping 
operations are ad hoc and are usually comprised of troops from contributing countries (ibid). 
With time, the structure of peacekeeping operations has evolved from being a fundamentally 
military model of monitoring cease-fire agreements and separating warring factions into an 
intricate model with many dimensions- military, police and civilian- working hand in hand to 
help ‘lay the foundations for sustainable peace’ (UN, 2008:18). Peacekeeping therefore can be 
categorised into two- military observer missions and the broader peacekeeping force.  
Military observer missions comprise unarmed troops dispatched into conflict areas with the 
responsibility of overseeing and monitoring the halting of hostilities, after factions to a conflict 
have conceded to a cease-fire agreement (UN, 2016). As such, traditional peacekeeping 
operation is a temporary conflict management strategy and is not very much concerned with 
political efforts at settling conflicts.  On the other hand, broader peacekeeping operations 
usually comprise military or para-military operations with an extensive peacekeeping mandate 
(ibid).  Usually made up of thousands of armed military personnel, such operations are tasked 
with the responsibility of creating buffer zones to separate the various factions (Ghali, 1992). 
These operations also assist and ensure the withdrawal of combatants from territories they 
unduly occupied during the conflict (Rugumamu, 2002). Extensive peacekeeping strategies are 
geared towards building trust among belligerents. This is because, the presence of a 
peacekeeping mission reassures factions to a conflict that their ‘contender’ will not leverage 
cease-fire agreements to gain undue military advantage.  
Beside this, multi-faceted peacekeeping operations usually take up temporarily legislative and 
administrative roles in conflicted states as a way of aiding the transfer of power from one group 
to another (UN, 2008). Such operations may also contribute towards the establishment of new 
administrative structures and may as part of their mandate provide “operational support to 
national law enforcement agencies; provide security at key government installations, ports and 
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other vital infrastructure, establish the necessary security conditions for the free ﬂow of people, 
goods and relief items and provide humanitarian assistance.” (UN, 2008:23) 
Peacekeeping operations, whether conducted by the UN or any other regional organization 
requires that the mission has an explicit and precise mandate that guides its actions on the 
ground (Labuda, 2015). Generally, the mandate of peacekeeping operations are hinged on the 
principles of neutrality, consent of the various factions involved in the conflict and the non-use 
of force by peacekeepers except in instances of self-defence or defence of the mission’s 
mandate (Rugumamu, 2002). Also, the mandate of peacekeeping missions are designed in view 
of the availability of resources to support the missions operations. Importantly, PKO’s require 
a wide array of skills and expertise in fields such as ‘mediation, negotiation and liaison’ (ibid).  
2.5.3 Peace Enforcement 
With time, peace enforcement has become a crucial component of conflict management, due 
to the difficulties that arise with peacekeeping operations. Especially in instances where there 
is no peace to keep, hence, necessitating the need for the intervention force to first create the 
needed peace. Unlike the other conflict management mechanisms, peace enforcement entail 
the active usage of military force and other coercive measures as a means to resolving conflicts 
(UN, 2016). The usage of force in peace enforcement is not necessarily towards self-defence 
of troops as in peace keeping missions where force is only used as the last resort. In this case, 
the application of force is a strategic approach used as a ‘bargaining chip’ to ensure adherence 
to ceasefire agreements (Labuda, 2015). Such measures are usually imposed on conflicting 
parties by the UN Security Council, after the council determines that an ongoing conflict poses 
a threat to international peace and security. However, the implementation of such coercive 
measures is usually carried out by a group of countries or regional and sub-regional 
organizations (UN, 2018). Inter alia, peace-enforcement initiatives include military 
interventions, sanctions and blockades (ibid).  
More often, the application of force in peace enforcement is intended to compel belligerents to 
cease-fire and to create a secured environment for civilians and aid workers. Unlike 
peacekeeping missions which require the consent of warring factions, a peace enforcement 
mission does not need the approval of belligerents (Nwosu, 2014). Consequently, such 
missions may not take into consideration state sovereignty especially in instances where the 
state is a party to the conflict and opposes the operation (ibid). In view of this, peace 
enforcement missions usually require international mandates in order to make their operations 
legitimate. Due to the nature of peace enforcement, the missions are usually equipped with full 
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range military capabilities, enough to match or supersede that of belligerents (Jackson, 2008). 
That notwithstanding, the ultimate aim of enforcement operations is to get the parties to a 
conflict to the negotiating table, hence such operations are usually constrained by political 
factors. As such, peace enforcement does not necessarily guarantee sustainable peace, neither 
does it seek to address the causal factors of the conflict. Rather, such initiatives only serve as a 
means through which peace can be attained (Domke, S & Solon, J 2018).  
2.5.4 Peacebuilding 
Lederach (2013) conceives peacebuilding as a “comprehensive concept that encompasses, 
generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform 
conflict toward more sustainable peaceful relationships” (Lederach, 2013). The Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) further defines peacebuilding as 
involving attempts at establishing structures that address both ‘structural and proximate’ causes 
of conflicts and ‘delegitimize’ brutality as a mechanism for resolving disputes. It also involves 
enhancing the capacity of societies to peacefully deal with conflicts (Melander, 2015).  
Post-conflict peacebuilding encompasses activities that predates the signing of peace accords. 
In view of this, peacebuilding initiatives are geared towards preventing countries from 
relapsing into conflict and also provides the platform for stability, economic and social 
development (Peacebuilding, 2013). Peacebuilding efforts therefore seek to augment conflict 
prevention, peacekeeping, peace-making and development strategies. These activities are often 
centred on consolidating existing peace by identifying and supporting structures that will 
improve human wellbeing in countries recovering from conflicts (ibid). Hence, the 
fundamental goal of peacebuilding is to achieve positive peace.  
Further, peacebuilding involves a broad array of ‘physical, social and structural initiatives’ 
leading to capacity building, reconciliation, state building and social transformation in 
countries recovering from conflicts (Maiese, 2003). Such initiatives may include the 
demobilization and disarmament of combatants in a war, the restoration of democracy, law and 
order and repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons. It further extends to 
undertaking electoral, security sector, constitutional and judicial reforms and the establishment 
and strengthening of government institutions to enhance broader public participation in the 
governance process (Ghali, 1992).  
In attempts to construct a new environment needed for sustained peace, post-conflict 
peacebuilding tackles social, humanitarian, economic and cultural problems that either 
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precipitated or are the effects of a conflict (ibid). Sustainable peace is only possible in an 
environment where structural and physical violence are absent, hence, necessitating the focus 
of peacebuilding efforts on resolving the root cause of conflicts (Omeje, 2010). As such, it is a 
long-term process initiated at the end of a conflict unlike other short-term conflict management 
mechanisms such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement which are implemented during 
conflicts. In view of its futuristic approach, peacebuilding initiatives carry the propensity to 
prevent future conflicts as it establishes alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
(Peacebuilding, 2013).    
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the conceptual framework which underpins the study. Essentially, 
concepts examined includes conflicts, security regionalism and conflict management. With 
conflict management being a broad term, this thesis explains it in four dimensions: 
peacekeeping, peace building, peace-making and peace enforcement. These concepts are 
relevant in the examination of ECOWAS’ conflict management in West Africa. The chapter 
also explained the drivers of conflicts in West Africa. The next chapter explores efforts at 
institutionalizing conflict management in West Africa. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INSTITUTIONALIZING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN WEST AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction 
As stated in chapter one, the rationale for the establishment of ECOWAS was to foster 
economic integration among West African states. However, over the years, the focus of the 
organization has expanded beyond championing development within the sub-region to 
addressing security concerns of member states. This chapter seeks to trace efforts at 
institutionalizing conflict management by ECOWAS. The chapter analyses treaties, protocols 
and frameworks adopted by ECOWAS in this regard. These will include the Protocol on Non-
Aggression (1978), Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence (1981), Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999); Protocol on 
Democracy and Good governance (2001), and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework 
(2008).  
3.2 Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) 
The adoption of the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) was precipitated by attacks on the 
territorial integrity of some EOWAS member states. In the 1970s, two West African states 
became ‘victims’ of external aggression, hence necessitating the need for a regional ‘defence 
pact’ (Kabia, 2011). On 2 November 1970, Portuguese mercenaries, numbering about 350 
attempted to invade Conakry (Guinea) in their efforts to take-over military camps and air strips. 
Although the invasion was foiled, a second invasion attempt was launched by the mercenaries. 
Despite the failure of the invasion attempts, the mercenaries successfully captured the 
Camayenne prison and subsequently released all political prisoners (Worldwide, 1970). 
Following the event, most African states, including Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Senegal and 
Ivory Coast pledged to offer financial and military aid to help boost security in Guinea as a 
way of preventing any further attacks (Cowell, 2011). Although the allegation was denied by 
the Portuguese government, a UN mission dispatched to Guinea confirmed the involvement of 
an external power (Portugal) in the invasion, leading to a UN resolution condemning the attack 
(Worldwide, 1970). Similarly, Benin thwarted a mercenary attack on its territory in 1977. 
However, unlike the Guinea attacks, the perpetrators of the Benin ‘invasion’ were not 
identified. That notwithstanding, the President of Benin, Mathieu Kerekou, blamed Togo, Cote 
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D’Ivoire and Senegal (all member states of ECOWAS) for their involvement in the attacks 
(Adeniji, 1997). It is however worth noting that during the 1970’s, imperial powers leveraged 
their relationship with some African countries to unduly interfere in the internal affairs of other 
newly independent states, hence, giving credence to the allegations.   
Further, border disputes between West African states became increasingly bloody in the 1970’s 
(Okolo, 1983). The border dispute between Mali and Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) for instance, 
resulted in several casualties. Also, in January 1976, Togo called for the ‘adjustment of its 
frontiers with Ghana. Subsequently, the government of Ghana blamed Togo for supporting 
secessionist activities in the Volta region (Afolabi, 2016).  In the same vein, Senegal and 
Guinea-Bissau disputed over their maritime border (ibid). These inter-state tensions and 
disputes carried the potency of escalating into violent conflicts within the sub-region.  
In view of these emerging security challenges in the region, it became necessary for ECOWAS 
to redefine its role as a political actor in the community. Hence, the prioritization of the 
organization’s efforts towards developing appropriate mechanisms to ensure regional peace 
and stability. This resulted in the adoption of the sub-regions’ first security pact in 1978 by the 
Authority of Heads of State and Government, the highest decision-making body of the 
organization (Okolo, 1983). The Protocol on Non-Aggression was therefore geared towards 
augmenting the deficiency in the Treaty of Lagos. 
Essentially, the protocol sought to refrain member states from employing ‘threats or the use of 
force or aggression’ in their relations with other sovereign states within the sub-region (Kabia, 
2011). Again, the agreement sought to deter member states from either directly ‘committing, 
encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of other Member States’ or allowing foreign residents or 
non-residents to perpetrate such activities using their territory (ECOWAS, 1978:3). As a way 
of consolidating existing stability, the protocol provided for the peaceful resolution of all 
disputes and established a minimal mechanism for resolving disagreements that member states 
lacked the capacity to resolve. 
In its essence, most non-aggression treaties lack the capacity to dissuade the use of military 
offensive by states (Okolo, 1983). However, the adoption of the protocol was an important step 
by ECOWAS towards affirming its commitment of leveraging peace and security as a tool to 
promote economic development in West Africa. The adoption of the protocol also exemplified 
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the willingness of member states of the community and the goodwill of its leaders to constrain 
their sovereignty for the common good of the sub-region in terms of peace, security and 
defence. In view of this, the protocol provided a minimal basis of trust among member states 
of the community, especially between the Francophone states and Nigeria (Adeleke, 1995).  
That notwithstanding, although the protocol recognized emerging security threats within the 
region, it lacked the needed rigour and mechanisms to either prevent the occurrence of conflicts 
or effectively resolve disputes when they arose. In this regard, the treaty was a mere utopia as 
it did not provide pragmatic means for achieving its objectives.  
Also, the protocol did not provide for the establishment of adequate institutions to address 
conflicts. In anyway, the mechanism for resolving conflicts provided for in article 5 of the 
treaty was not established. However, even if established, the mechanism was wholly inadequate 
to tackle the complexities of the regional security climate at the time. The emerging security 
challenges within the region required a much more robust and proactive approach. 
Unfortunately, member states of the community lacked the political will to commit to this. 
Again, the treaty failed to envision intra-state conflicts as a significant threat to regional 
stability. Prior to the adoption of the protocol, the most devastating internal conflict within 
West Africa had been the bloody three years civil war between the Nigerian government and 
the Biafra secessionist from 1967 until 1970. That notwithstanding, the framers of the treaty 
failed to recognize the impact of such civil wars on the sub-region’s stability and the possibility 
of resurgence of such conflicts. Hence, the narrow focus of the treaty on inter-state wars and 
its absolute silence on domestic conflicts.    
3.3 Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence, 1981 (PMAD) 
Against the background of the inadequacy of the Protocol on Non-Aggression to prevent 
external aggression and the occurrence of internal conflicts, it became necessary for ECOWAS 
to revise its security strategy. As such, a proposal from the presidents of Senegal and Togo, for 
the adoption of another protocol on regional security was not only necessary but crucial in the 
determination of the capacity of ECOWAS to intervene in future conflicts. Subsequently, the 
Authority of Heads of States and Government adopted the PMAD in May 1981. Despite 
significant efforts made in the adoption of the protocol, it only came into force in September 
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1986. However, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Mali abstained from signing the document 
(Okolo, 1983). 
The protocol called on member states of the community to make available mutual aid and 
support to safeguard countries within the sub-region from any form of armed threat or 
aggression (ECOWAS, 1986).  The protocol further provided for conditions under which the 
regional organization could intervene in inter-state or intra-state conflicts. These conditions 
included the failure of states to recourse to peaceful means of resolving disputes. As well as 
the involvement of external entities in domestic conflicts of member states, with the capacity 
to destabilize the sub-region (Article 4, PMAD). In any such situations, the protocol legitimized 
intervention by ECOWAS either through military means or other diplomatic approaches such 
as mediation.   
To facilitate the operationalization of the protocol, provision was made for the establishment 
of three institutions, namely, the Authority, Defence Council and Defence Commission. The 
Authority was mandated to determine the conditions under which military action would be 
expedient. Such decisions could only be warranted upon a written request by a member state 
for assistance from the regional organization.  However, the protocol provided for such 
decisions to be implemented by the Allied Forces of the Community (AAFC). The AAFC 
served as the military wing of the organization and comprised of troops from member states. 
That notwithstanding, the AAFC could only be legitimately deployed in the event that the 
territorial integrity of a member state of the community was undermined. The Defence Council 
was however responsible for examining emergency situations in order to determine the most 
appropriate ‘strategy to be adopted and the means of intervention to be used’ (ECOWAS, 
1986:5). The Defense Commission on the other hand was ‘responsible for examining the 
technical aspect of defence matters’ (Article 11, PMAD).  
Compared to the previous protocol, the PMAD was a signficant improvement and reaffirmed 
the commitment of leaders of the sub-region to maintaining peace and security. Despite this, 
the new protocol lacked the needed mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in 
the region. Like the Protocol on Non-Aggression, the PMAD focused more on curtailing 
external aggression rather than addressing the potential causes of conflicts such as the incessant 
coup d’etats, malgovernance and the lack of respect for human rights, prevalent in the region 
at the time. Also, the pact was inapplicable to ‘internal subversions’ except for domestic 
conflicts that were externally motivated (ECOWAS, 1986). As such, the stipulation of 
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conditions for intervention by the protocol delineated legitimate basis for intervening in the 
domestic affairs of member states from unjustifiable ones, in order to protect the sovereignty 
of member states (Cowell, 2011). This phenomenon could however, be attributed to attempts 
by leaders of the bloc to preserve their regimes (Atuobi, 2010). Added to the above, the lack 
of unanimity among member states at the early stages of the drafting of the pact implied that 
the legitimacy of the document was in question. This became evident when there was a lack of 
consensus among member states of the organization on the role of ECOWAS in the Liberian 
civil war.   
Further, the protocol appeared to have been a ‘mere lip service’ as institutions provided for by 
the document were never established. This was partly as a result of the old-age Franco-
Anglophone contensions within the sub-region (Aning, 2004). With the Francophone countries 
suspicious of Nigeria’s ‘hegemonic ambitions’, the organization could not marshal a common 
front to operationalize the protocol. This was further exacerbated by a provision in the protocol 
that called on member states to evacuate all foreign troops from their territory (Adeniji, 1997). 
With most of the Francophone states depending on France for assistance in defence and 
security, such provisions by the protocol was seemingly impossible to implement (Kabia, 
2011). Further, prior to the adoption of the PMAD, the Francophone states in the sub-region 
had adopted the ‘Accord de Non Aggression et d’ Assistance en matiere de Defense’ to resolve 
disputes arising among the former French colonies  (Adeniji, 1997). By 1981, institutions to 
implement the provisions of the accord had been established including the secretriat. Similarly, 
Equatorial Guinea had stronger military ties with Spain while China had a military assistance 
entente with Mali and Guinea (Okolo, 1983). As such, the external relations of member states 
of the community as well as their commitment to other security agreements waned their loyalty 
to the PMAD.   
Moreover, although the PMAD made room for the dispatch of a sub-regional military force, 
the AAFC was only an adhoc institution. In the absence of a standing army, swift military 
interventions to assist member states in the event of external aggression or internal conflicts 
was almost impossible to attain. Hence, defeating the purpose for which the protocol was 
adopted. Interestingly, the PMAD did not stipulate preventive measures to control the uprise 
of conflicts in the region, although at the time the protocol came into force, there had been 
signs that some countries in the sub-region were gradually headed towards conflict.  
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3.4 Protocol Relating to The Mechanism For Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security, 1999 
(Mechanism) 
A pivotal point in the consolidation of ECOWAS’ security undertaking was the adoption of the 
Revised ECOWAS Treaty in 1993. Unlike the 1975 Lagos treaty that did not ascribe the 
responsibility of ensuring regional peace and stability to ECOWAS, the Revised Treaty 
recognized the challenges posed by civil wars and conflicts to peace and development in West 
Africa (Adeniji, 1997). Although previous efforts by the regional organization to secure the 
sub-region were useful, they could not prevent the outbreak of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
civil wars. As such, a robust approach towards preventing conflicts was needed to contain the 
rapid spread of violence within the region. In achieveing this, member states of the community 
sought to address the root causes of conflicts in the sub-region. The approach to finding a 
lasting solution to conflicts in the region included the adoption of the Declaration of Political 
Principles by ECOWAS, revising of the ECOWAS treaty and the adoption of the Mechanism. 
In its essence, the Declaration of Political Principles of ECOWAS sought to reaffirm the 
commitment of member states of ECOWAS to the  principles of rule of law and respect for 
fundamental human rights as well as democractic values, including citizens right to participate 
in the governance process (ECOWAS, 1991).  
Article 58 (2) of the Revised Treaty stipulates the need for member states of the community to 
work effectively towards “establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the 
timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts” within the region 
(ECOWAS, 1993). Among others, the revised treaty provides for the establishment of a 
regional ‘peace and security observation system’, as well as a peacekeeping force and 
reemphasizes the need to resort to peaceful means such as mediation, conciliation and good 
offices for the settlemt of disputes (ibid) . Again, the treaty made room for the regional 
organization to render electoral support to member states in the form of election monitoring 
(Article 58(2g)). This marked a significant shift in ECOWAS’ approach to conflicts, from 
merely reacting to crisis to conflict prevention. It is towards this end, that the Mechanism was 
adopted by the Authority of Heads of State and Government in 1999. The Mechanism is an 
instrumental strategy towards ensuring that norms on the ‘collective management of regional 
security’ would be strenghtened and institutionalised on a permanent basis (Aning, 2004). 
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Also, with the regional organization under immense pressure to match up to the emerging 
security challenges and the many lessons learnt from the experimental interventions in Liberia 
and Sierrea Leone, the mechanism was aimed at providing a clear sense of direction to 
ECOWAS in its future security engagements. The Mechansim was therefore a replacement of 
earlier protocols and provides the approach through which the provisions of the Revised Treaty 
can be realized (Okyere,  F & Atuobi, S 2010). Among others, the mechanism sought to 
‘prevent, manage and resolve’ internal as well as interstate conflicts in order to maintain and 
‘consolidate peace, security and stability within West Africa’ (ECOWAS, 1999:5). The 
protocol further sought to address issues relating to corruption, money laundering and the illicit 
proliferation of small arms, as significant components of its conflict resolution and prevention 
strategy.   
Institutions responsible for the operationalization of the protocol includes: the Authority, the 
Mediation and Security Council (MSC) and the Executive Secretariat (ECOWAS, 1999). Other 
instituitions established by the mechanism includes: the Defence and Security Commission, 
the Council of Elders and the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). It also 
provided for the establishment of an Early Warning Observation and Monitoring System 
(ECOWAS, 1999).  
Under the new sub-regional security framework, the Authority, comprising the Heads of States 
and Governments of member states of the community is the highest decision making body. 
That notwithstanding, the Authority under article 7 of the Mechanism yields its power to the  
Mediation and Security Council (MSC) to make decisions on its behalf in ensuring the 
implementation of the protocol. In view of this, the MSC is vested with the authority to make 
decisions on all issues that pertains to sub-regional peace and security and also implements all 
policies geared towards ‘conflict prevention, management and resolution’ (Article 10). The 
MSC is effectively supported by the Defense and Security Commission which is responsible 
for determining the mandate of peacekeeping forces and ‘examining all technical, 
administrative and logistical’ concerns of peacekeeping operations (Article 11). As part of its 
mandate, the Commission is also required to review reports from the various ‘Observation and 
Monitoring Centres’ and based on these, make recommendations for appropriate actions to be 
taken by the MSC.  
The Council of Elders on the other hand comprise a group of eminent persons who utilize their 
good offices to act as ‘mediators, conciliators and facilitators’ on behalf of ECOWAS during 
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conflicts (ECOWAS, 1999). These individuals are required by the mechanism to be neutral, 
objective and impartial in the discharge of their mandate. The idea of the council of elders has 
its origin in traditional African conflict resolution mechanisms.  
Further, the Mechanism provides a clear mandate for the establishment of  the ECOWAS 
Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG is an adhoc stand-by military wing of 
ECOWAS, comprising of troops from member states.  Among others, ECOMOG is responsible 
for ‘peace-keeping and restoration of peace, enforcement of sanctions, peace-building, 
disarmament and demobilisation, and preventive deployment’ (Article 22).   
To consolidate the strategies and measures put in place to prevent the occurrence of conflicts, 
the Mechanism established the Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC). The OMC is the 
focal point of the early warning system (Odobo K & Andekin, S O 2017). The centre is 
responsible for collecting and analyzing data essential to the prevention of conflict and violence 
(ECOWAS, 1999). Under the early warning system, the sub-region has been divided into four 
zones, based on proximity and efficiency, with each zone having a zonal headquarters. The 
zonal centres are responsible for the day to day monitoring of political, social and economic 
events that have the tendency to threaten peace and security of countries within the zone and 
subsequently come up with ‘threat perception analysis’ (Aning, 2004). Reports from the zonal 
bureaux are sent to the Executive Secretariat for the appropriate response mechanisms to be 
designed.  
The Mechanism provides three means through which potential conflicts could be prevented. 
These include the setting up of a fact finding commission, resorting to the committee of elders 
or leveraging the services of the Executive Secretary (ibid). If all these strategies prove futile, 
then military force will be employed as the last resort by the organization. The early warning 
system is crucial in strenghtening the national security of member states and aiding security 
sector reforms within the sub-region as well as promoting preventive diplomacy (Atuobi, 
2010).  
Unlike previous protocols that emphasized resolving inter-state conflicts, the Mechanism 
focuses on internal conflicts. The protocol is therefore applicable to conflicts which can 
potentially degenerate into a humanitarian disaster or threaten sub-regional peace and security 
(ECOWAS, 1999). The Mechanism may also be invoked if a conflict situation could result in 
gross violation of human rights or in the event of the toppling or attempt to topple a 
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‘democratically elected government’ (Article 25). Also, unlike previous protocols that 
stipulated that such interventions could only be carried out upon the request of member states, 
the Mechanism makes it possible for ECOWAS to intervene in a conflict upon the decision of 
the Authority, MSC or the Executive Secretary (Article 26). 
3.5 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) 
The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (A/sp/1/12/01/) was adopted in 2001 by 
the Authority as a supplementary protocol to the Mechanism. Nonetheless, the protocol came 
into force in 2005, after it was ratified by member states. The protocol is concerned with 
tackling the rudimentary political causes of conflicts and instability in the region- an aspect of 
conflict prevention that was not comprehensively covered in the Mechanism (Odobo, K & 
Osagie, S 2017). In this regard, it aims at promoting democracy and the rule of law within the 
sub-region. The protocol upholds basic constitutional principles that member states must 
adhere to. These include, separation of powers among the various organs of government, the 
independence of the judiciary and the conduct of free and fair elections (ECOWAS, 2001). The 
constitutional principles contained in the protocol also include the non-tolerance ‘for power 
obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means’, the need for armed forces and other state 
security agencies to be apolitical and the need for citizens to be actively involved in the decision 
making process (ECOWAS, 2001). The protocol further calls for respect for civil and political 
rights and also guarantees the right of opposition parties. 
Also, the protocol makes it possible for ECOWAS to assist with the conduct of elections in 
member states, upon request by the countries involved. In realizing this, the protocol allows 
for ECOWAS to dispatch an election monitoring team where necessary (ECOWAS, 2001). 
The protocol also affirms the need for electoral laws to be respected and remain unaltered 
within six months prior to elections unless otherwise with the approval of majority of political 
actors (ibid). This provision is significant as the sub-region experienced high levels of 
unconstitutional change of governments in the 1980’s and 1990’s. In some instances, these 
undemocratic changes of governments culminated in conflicts and civil unrest. The document 
therefore sought to tackle some of the fundamental causes of conflicts in West Africa. 
In order to ensure the adherence of member states to the provisions of the protocol, article 45 
stipulates sanctions that will be imposed on member states upon breach of the protocol. 
Sanctions imposed may include, the ineligibility of countries concerned to host ECOWAS 
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meetings, ‘suspension of member states concerned from all ECOWAS decision making bodies’ 
and the ‘non-recognition of the government in community fora’ (Cowell, 2011). These 
sanctions depict the depth of relevance ascribed to democracy and good governance as being 
significant components of conflict prevention in West Africa. The protocol also addresses 
issues pertaining to poverty reduction and discrimination against women, children and youth. 
As such, the protocol sets out to tackle socio-political and economic conditions which 
previously triggered conflicts in the sub-region (ECOWAS, 2001).  
3.6 The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, 2008 (ECPF) 
Despite ECOWAS’ proven commitment towards ensuring regional stability,  the sub-region is 
yet to be completely liberated from conflicts. As such, as part of the quest to finding a 
permanent solution to its security challenges, ECOWAS adopted the ECPF in 2008. The ECPF 
was developed by the Mediation and Security Council with the intention to guide, inform and 
serve as a ‘strategic framework’ to enhance the capacity of ECOWAS in conflict prevention 
and human security (ECOWAS, 2008).  
Although the Mechanism had been instrumental in containing conflicts in the community, 
however, the realization of the preventive aspect of the protocol had been significantly hindered 
by the lack of a strategic approach (Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08). This was evident in the 
‘underutilization and misdirection’ of the organizations resources, which stifled the capacity of 
ECOWAS for timely intervention in conflicts. The ECPF therefore seeks to address structural 
and operational causes of conflicts by adopting a long-term preventive approach (ECOWAS, 
2008).  This approach involves the prevention of the outbreak, escalation and the recurrence of 
conflicts. Further, the ECPF provides a strong conceptual basis for understanding and 
ascertaining conflict prevention in the sub-region (Ekiyor, 2008). Also, the ECPF is geared 
towards improving the capacity of civil society and member states of ECOWAS in conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding (ibid). The recognition of the role of civil society in the 
framework is significant as it was the first time the regional grouping explicitly acknowledged 
and broadened its security strategy to accommodate civil society organizations. Furthermore, 
the ECPF sought to enhance the capacity of ECOWAS in undertaking definite and harmonized 
conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives, while ensuring that conflict 
prevention becomes mainstream in the programs and policies of ECOWAS (Atuobi, 2010). 
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The ECPF has fourteen components aimed at improving human security in the sub-region. 
These include: ‘(1) early warning (2) preventive diplomacy (3) democracy and political 
governance (4) human rights and the rule of law (5) media (6) natural resource governance and 
(7) cross-border initiatives’. ‘The rest are (8) governance (9) practical disarmament (10) 
women, peace and security (11) youth empowerment (12) ECOWAS Standby Force (13) 
humanitarian assistance and (14) peace education’ (ECOWAS, 2008).  
To ensure the succesful implementation of the framework, the document outlines for each of 
the fourteen priority areas, activities that will be undertaken to ensure their realization, the 
yardstick for evaluating their progress and the capacity requirement to achieve them (Ekiyor, 
2008). Also, an appropriate plan of action has been developed to ensure the implementation of 
all fourteen components. The ECPF therefore provides the strategy through which previous 
ECOWAS protocols on conflict management could be realized, by focusing fundamentally on 
addressing the root causes of conflicts and instability in the region (Cowell, 2011).  
Compared to the Mechanism and other strategies for ensuring peace and stability in the sub-
region, the ECPF marks a significant shift in a number of ways. First, it calls for improved 
coordination between the various departments and institutions of ECOWAS as well as among 
member states . Prior to the formulation of the ECPF, initiatives aimed at promoting good 
governance, democracy, gender equality, youth empowerment and the ECOWAS Early 
Warning and Response Mechanism (ECOWARN) operated in isolation (Afolabi, 2016). This 
resulted in the inefficacious use of resources and the duplication of efforts (Atuobi, 2010). That 
notwithstanding, although the document emphasizes the need for harmonization and 
coordination of conflict prevention initiatives and efforts, yet, it does not stipulate which 
institutions will be responsible for its implementation.   
Also, unlike the Mechanism that adopted an inward approach towards preventing conflicts, the 
ECPF broadens its scope to include collaboration with other sectors and a wide range of actors 
including state and non-state actors such as the private sector, donors, and other international 
organizations (Kabia, 2011). The ECPF is also significant in systematically bridging the gap 
that existed between ECOWAS, citizens of the community and civil society (Atuobi, 2010). 
Moreover, the ECPF adopts a much more comprehensive approach focusing on social, 
economic, security and political challenges that the sub-region is confronted with (Kabia, 
2011). This strategy is relevant as it recognizes the need to resolve structural challenges in the 
community that makes the sub-region vulnerable to conflicts. As such, the framework makes 
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it incumbent for member states to address these challenges concurrently as part of their 
development and conflict prevention plans.  
Nonetheless, since its adoption, the ECPF has been undermined by significant challenges 
which has rendered it ineffective. These challenges emanate from the need for the sub-regional 
grouping to simultaneously deal with emerging as well as ongoing security threats (Afolabi, 
2016). While addressing old threats to peace and security in the region, new threats are 
increasingly emerging, including the resurgence of coup d’etats, terrorism, electoral violence 
and the constraints on democractic consolidation and good governance in the sub-region 
(ibid:3). With ECOWAS still in the process of developing its proactive capacities to conflict 
prevention, the organization usually focuses on tackling unforseen crisis rather than 
implementing the ECPF. Quintessentially, the sub-region was gravely hit by political crisis 
between 2010 and 2014 which distracted ECOWAS from operationalizing the ECPF.      
Further, a study conducted by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 
revealed the low level of awareness of the ECPF among member states of the community 
(Okyere, F & Atuobi, S, 2010). This reflects a deeper problem hindering the implementation 
of ECOWAS’ conflict prevention initiatives. The onus lies on member states to safeguard their 
territory and national security. As such, without a deliberate effort by member states to take 
ownership of regional strategic security frameworks,  human security in the community may 
periodically be threatened. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Over the years, ECOWAS’ peace and security strategies have gone through significant 
modifications in order to meet the changing dynamics of conflicts and new threats to security 
in the sub-region. Essentially, recent strategies developed by the organization have been 
focused on preventive measures rather than merely reacting to conflicts as they emerge. This 
chapter has evaluated the various protocols and frameworks adopted by ECOWAS to ensure 
the sustainance of peace and stability in West Africa from 1978 until 2008. Unarguably, the 
contribution of ECOWAS towards conflict prevention, management and resolution in West 
Africa has been tremendous. However, the impact of  the institutional structures established by 
the organization has been mixed. The next chapter evaluates the challenges encountered by the 
bloc in its intervention in Liberia.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ECOWAS INTERVENTION IN THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR (1990-1997) 
4.1 Introduction 
After the establishment of ECOWAS, intra-state and inter-state disputes within West Africa 
did not exacerbate into armed conflicts until the outburst of the Liberian civil war in 1989. The 
bloodbath in Liberia adversely affected its neighbouring states and challenged the capacity of 
ECOWAS to ensure human security in the sub-region. Prior to the civil war, the organization 
had not been directly involved in the internal affairs of any of its member states. In view of 
this, ECOWAS did not have adequate institutional structures in place to aid its intervention in 
Liberia. However, ECOWAS intervened regardless. This chapter focuses on the complexities 
and challenges pertaining to the intervention. The chapter explores three thematic areas 
including the background to the conflict, the ECOWAS intervention (rationale and legality of 
the intervention), as well as the challenges encountered by ECOWAS with regards to its 
diplomatic and military approaches. 
4.2 Background to the Conflict 
Liberia consist of fifteen indigenous ethnic groups with each group having a unique culture, 
tradition, belief and language (Bøås, 2010). A critical aspect of the history of Liberia pertains 
to the repatriation of freed slaves from the United States to the former, between 1822 and 1861 
by the American Colonisation Society (ACS). The repatriated slaves settled along the coast of 
the West African state and numbered about 12,000 (Ero, 1995). The rationale for the 
repatriation of the ex-slaves was to create a haven where they could thrive and start life all over 
again. However, the challenge emanating from the resettlement of the freed slaves, who later 
established Liberia was that, they were not accustomed to the culture and traditions of the 
indigenous residents they encountered (Rosenberg, 1985). Hence, their survival was dependent 
on the strength they exuded in their relations with the local folks. Upon establishing Liberia, 
the Americo-Liberians, with little education and governance experience, formed a government 
which was premised on the concept of ‘the self’ and ‘the other’, based on their experience as 
slaves in America (Pitts, 1999). Highly discontented with their oppressive rule, the indigenous 
people rebelled on several occasions. As such, the   Liberian state was built on a foundation 
deeply rooted in hatred and resentment. 
After the establishment of the True Whig Party (TWP) in 1870, Liberia became a one-party 
state with the Americo-Liberians controlling every aspect of political, economic and social life 
in the country (Bøås, 2010). The oligarchic rule of the TWP side-lined the indigenous people, 
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as they were perceived as second-class citizens. The TWP also adopted the indirect rule system 
of governance to control the territories in the hinterlands. This system entrenched existing 
ethnic animosities and rivalries among the indigenous people and further deprived them the 
opportunity to vote during elections (Rosenberg, 1985).  
However, when William Tubman became president in 1944, he pursued a policy of unification 
that sought to include the indigenous people in the governance process (Tarr, 1993). Tubman’s 
administration focused on modernizing the country’s economy and developing the basic 
infrastructure. In spite of this, Tubman repressed political opposition and rewarded his loyal 
cronies with ‘public money’ (Ero, 1995). This approach defeated his integrationist agenda as 
the stratification between citizens persisted. In view of this, upon his succession by William 
Tolbert in 1971, majority of Liberians lived in extreme poverty and the neo-patrimonial and 
clientelist political structures were dominated by the Americo-Liberian minority.  
Tolbert continued with the ‘integrationist policies’ initiated by his predecessor and broadened 
political participation (Sessay, 1996). The new administration was however plagued with 
corruption and mismanagement of state resources. Unlike the previous administration which 
thrived on oppression of political opposition to ensure sustenance of the status quo, Tolbert’s 
inability to use patronage and coercion rendered his regime insecure (Tarr, 1993). During his 
tenure, two leading civil society organizations emerged. The Movement for Justice in Africa 
(MOJA) and the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) were formed with the intention to 
influence the government to deal with the social injustice prevalent in the country (Sessay, 
1996). The frustration and discontent of the citizens culminated when the government passed 
a law depriving landless and poor Liberians from voting as well as the government’s plan to 
increase the price of rice (Pitts, 1999).  A demonstration organized by PAL to protest against 
the hike in rice prices in April 1979 resulted in a conflict between protestors and the police. 
Consequently, Tolbert declared a state of emergency and ordered for the arrest of leaders of 
opposition groups.  
In view of this, on 12 April 1980, a group of seventeen young soldiers led by Samuel Doe 
toppled the government and assassinated Tolbert and some other member of his administration 
(Sirleaf, 1991). Most Liberians supported the coup d’état as they envisioned a new era of 
economic growth and development. Initially, the military junta undertook some reforms to 
improve the livelihood of civil servants and military personnel. However, Doe did not resolve 
the neo-patrimonial structure established by the previous regimes (Kufour, 1993). The 
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leadership of the People’s Redemption Council (PRC), established after the coup, enriched 
themselves with state resources and further polarized and politicized ethnicity. Although Doe’s 
despotic regime engaged in widespread human rights abuses, yet, it gained the support of the 
US due to the Cold War (ibid).  After five years of military rule, Doe agreed to undertake 
constitutional reforms and conduct elections in 1985. The election was rigged in Doe’s favour 
and shortly afterwards, an attempted coup to topple his regime by Thomas Qwiwonkpa, an 
ethnic Gio was foiled. In response, the Armed forces of Liberia systematically repressed all 
opponents of the ruling party, especially the Gio and Mano communities (Kieh, 2004). It is 
against this background that the fourteen years civil war occurred. 
In view of the prevailing socio-economic conditions, on Christmas eve 1989, Charles Taylor 
together with a small group of armed men invaded Liberia from neighbouring Cote D’Ivoire 
(Sirleaf, 1991). The number of young men joining Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) increased tremendously with time. This was an evidence that the uprising was 
supported by many Liberians who were frustrated by Doe’s despotic regime. In response to the 
rebellion, Doe’s army targeted the ethnic Gio’s and Mano’s, the support base of Taylor. The 
NPFL on the contrary targeted Krahn and Mandingo communities in their reprisal attacks 
(Sesay, 1996). The fighting along ethnic lines at the initial stages of the conflict set a precedent 
for subsequent militia groups to be formed along the same lines. 
4.3 ECOWAS Intervention 
Due to the heavy-handed counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the Armed Forces of Liberia 
(AFL), the war quickly spread across the country, reaching Monrovia by mid-1990. The 
fighting resulted in gross violation of human rights and indiscriminate attacks on embassies. 
The United Nations office in Monrovia for instance, was attacked by the AFL on 30 May 1990 
(Tuck, 2000). As such, the impending humanitarian crisis resulted in a call for the international 
community to intervene. 
Without well-established institutions to respond to the atrocities in Monrovia, ECOWAS 
established a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to redress the crisis in April 1990 (Kieh, 
2004). The committee was however intended to assume a permanent role in conflict mediation 
within the sub-region (Walraven, 1999). As a first step towards resolving the conflict, the SMC 
established ECOMOG, comprising contingents from the five-member states that formed the 
committee (Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Gambia and Togo) in addition to Sierra-Leone and Guinea-
Conakry (ibid). However, other member states of the community contributed towards the 
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troops later in the intervention. The SMC also set-up a Special Emergency Fund to mobilize 
funds to support ECOMOG’s operations in Liberia. 
4.3.1 Rationale behind the intervention 
As the invasion evolved into full scale war, the international community refrained from 
intervening. The US in particular was more interested in the Iraq invasion of Kuwait rather 
than the crisis in Liberia. Similarly, the UN Security Council refrained from intervening in the 
conflict (Tarr, 1993). As such, the sub-regional group took upon itself the mandate to determine 
the fate of Liberia. In view of this, ECOWAS stipulated a number of reasons why the 
intervention was necessary.  
The first reason alluded by ECOWAS for the intervention pertained to regional stability 
(Sirleaf, 1991). Members of the community argued that, the refugee crisis emanating from the 
conflict could potentially destabilize Liberia’s neighbouring states. According to General 
Erskine of ECOMOG, “the crisis in Liberia was creating an unbearable refugee problem for 
Sierra Leone, Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast. Hence, it was obvious 
that the situation in Liberia had gone beyond the boundaries of the country and ceased to be an 
exclusive Liberian question” (Olu,1997:3). Beyond the refugee crisis, the ongoing war had 
spilled over into neighbouring Sierra Leone. The NPFL assisted the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone to overthrow the 29-year old constitutionally elected government 
in Freetown (Sesay, 1996). This sparked fear among the leaders of the community that the 
NPFL could support and incite war across West Africa, which would eventually threaten 
existing regimes and destabilize the region. This became a primary issue of concern because 
Taylor’s NPLF comprised of youths from across West Africa, hence making it possible for any 
such rebellion to be sustained in other countries within the sub-region (Adibe, 1997). 
Further, ECOWAS justified its decision to intervene on humanitarian grounds (Adeleke, 1995). 
The SMC argued that the country had been rendered ungovernable and that warring factions 
had ‘held the entire population hostage, depriving them of food, health facilities and other basic 
necessities of life’ (Olu,1997). Also, the use of child soldiers by the warring factions became 
an issue of concern to the community. The intervention was therefore aimed at stopping the 
massacre and human rights abuses, in order to restore the country to normalcy and reinstate 
democracy. 
Another justification for the intervention was based on the PMAD which provided for member 
states to request for assistance from the regional body upon the outbreak of conflicts instigated 
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or supported from outside (Okyere, 2014). In view of this, Doe wrote a letter to the chairman 
of ECOWAS and the SMC requesting for the organization to dispatch a peace-keeping force 
to calm the turmoil. Some scholars however argue that Doe could not be regarded as the legal 
authority in the country considering the fact that a greater part of the country at the time of the 
request was under the control of the NPLF (Afolabi, 2017 ). This study, however, argues that 
such a supposition will be untenable as a successful insurrection does not invalidate the 
legitimacy of a constitutionally elected government. 
Nonetheless, these were not the only justification for the intervention as individual member 
states of the community had unique reasons why they supported the intervention. Nigeria’s 
leadership role in the ECOMOG operation is worth understudying.  Historically, the 
relationship that existed between Nigeria and Liberia was based on the principles underlying 
the formers foreign policy of promoting African integration (Arowolo, 2015). In this regard, 
both countries were instrumental in the formation of ECOWAS. However, the coup d’état that 
resulted in the overhauling of the Tubman administration resulted in a strain relationship 
between the constitutionally elected government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari of Nigeria and his 
Liberian counterpart Samuel Doe (Kufour, 1993). Shagari condemned Doe’s ascendency into 
the presidency on the grounds that such actions carried the potency of spreading into other parts 
of the already politically instable region. In view of this, Nigeria adopted a diplomatic offensive 
approach towards Doe’s government. A case in point was the resistance of Nigeria towards 
Doe’s admission into the ECOWAS summit hosted by Abuja in 1980. However, Nigeria’s 
foreign policy towards Liberia changed in the mid-1980’s. This came as a result of Abuja’s 
mediatory role in the diplomatic crisis which arose between Liberia and the other member 
states of the Mano River Union, after the latter was accused of supporting anti-Doe rebellion 
(Ofodile, 1994). 
As such, the initial reaction of Nigeria to the civil war was to view it as an internal affair which 
required no external involvement (Arowolo, 2015). In view of this, Nigeria refrained from 
evacuating its nationals from Monrovia, since that would have created the impression that the 
situation in the country was out of control. However, Doe’s visit to Nigeria to request for 
armaments to quell the rebellion resulted in some belligerents perceiving Abuja as an ardent 
supporter of Doe’s regime. The subsequent attacks on Nigerians and other foreign nationals 
influenced Nigeria’s stance on the conflict (Okyere, 2014).  
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Nigeria’s leading role in the operation of ECOMOG was therefore based on Abuja’s foreign 
policy and responsibility to protect Nigerians abroad (Gberie, 2004). At the onset of the crisis, 
several thousand foreign nationals were trapped in Monrovia including 6000 Ghanaians and 
over 5000 Nigerians. In July 1990, the NPLF attacked and killed about a thousand Nigerians 
who had taken refuge in the Nigerian Embassy in Monrovia (Afolabi, 2017 ). In view of such 
blatant disregard for international diplomatic principles, Abuja needed to revise its strategy in 
order to safeguard the security of its nationals in Monrovia (Howe, 1996). Added to this, 
Nigeria also had economic interest in Liberia as Abuja had invested in various sectors of the 
Monrovian economy including the oil and iron ore industries. The head of state of Nigeria, 
Ibrahim Babangida, also had personal ties with Samuel Doe “with whom he had established 
business ties by participating in the Liberian national oil company” (Walraven, 1999).  Nigeria 
had also given Liberia a grant of 20 million dollars to support the building of an institution of 
higher learning (ibid). It was therefore in the national interest of Nigeria to champion the 
regional blocs intervention.  
Abuja was also concerned with the ripple effect of the insurgency in Liberia, fearing that it 
would flare a new wave of insurgency across the sub-region (Adeleke, 1995). At the early 
stages of the intervention, Babangida stressed the potential threat the defeat of the Liberian 
military posed to the sub-region. He further postulated that the success of the insurrection 
would undermine the strength and political standing of the military in the region (Tavares, 
2011). This fear was aggravated by the fact that the NPFL was not only composed of Liberians 
but also, nationals of other West African states (Ero, 1995). This reaffirmed the suspicion that 
the rebellion was not only targeted at Liberia but the sub-region. These youngsters had received 
training, money and ammunitions from Libya to aid the insurgency in West Africa (ibid). With 
socio-economic and political conditions in Liberia similar to that of other countries in the sub-
region and the readiness of the NPFL to support other insurrections, the uprising appeared to 
have been the beginning of instability in the region. Nigeria therefore aimed at not only 
salvaging itself but the sub-region from the emerging anarchy and chaos. Besides, Nigeria 
wanted to reassert and protect itself as a hegemonic power in the region (Gberie, 2004).  
"Nigeria's military brass hats were determined, at all costs, to make a success of their historical 
role as the protective 'big brother' with special responsibilities in the subregion” (ibid). 
With its attributes of natural resources, size and military capability, Nigeria’s hegemonic role 
in leading peace initiatives in her geo-political zone is not unprecedented (Arowolo, 2015). As 
such, Nigeria assumed the leadership role in the intervention in order to dissuade Western 
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powers, especially France, from permeating the region. Such a postulation is consistent with 
Hettne’s (2008) conception of security regionalism. Abuja also sought to limit the influence of 
the Francophone states in the sub-region. Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire for instance were 
ardent opposers of Nigeria’s leadership role in the region. Hence, their support for the NPFL 
sparked up a substantive challenge for regional hegemony (Salami,2015).  Further, the 
involvement of Libya in the conflict posed a threat to Nigeria’s hegemonic role since the 
formers support for the NPFL was geared towards gaining a significant amount of influence in 
West Africa (ibid). In this way, the reputation of Nigeria as a powerful force that ensured the 
stability of the region was threatened by these countries involved in the conflict, hence 
necessitating Abuja’s reaction.  
Ghana on the other hand intervened for reasons distinct from Nigeria, but with the same goal 
of advancing its national interest. On the individual level of analysis, Ghana’s head of state at 
the time, Jerry John Rawlings was a military dictator. As such, attempts by Taylor to topple 
Doe, who was an ex-military dictator seemed unacceptable to him (Pitts, 1999). Also, Accra 
had strained relations with Libya and Burkina Faso at the time of the insurrection. With these 
countries supporting the NPFL, Ghana found it prudent to support ECOMOG, especially after 
Taylor recruited some Ghanaians into his ‘army’ (Tavares,2011). Also, the burden of hosting 
refugees from the war and the many Ghanaians trapped in Liberia influenced Ghana’s decision 
to intervene. Sierra Leone and Gambia also supported the ECOWAS intervention because of 
the threat the conflict posed to their national security. Beyond this, Freetown supported the 
intervention to please its ally, Nigeria. This is due to the latter’s financial support to boost 
economic development in Sierra Leone (ibid). 
On the other hand, Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, though members states of ECOWAS 
supported the NPFL for personal, economic and strategic reasons (Sessay, 1996). As a matter 
of fact, personal reasons were extremely crucial in explaining the posture of these countries. A 
significant factor which influenced Abidjan’s position in the conflict pertained to the 
assassination of Adolphus Tolbert, the son in-law of Houphouet-Boigny, during the Doe-led 
coup d’état (Tuck, 2000). In view of this, the cordial relation between both countries was 
ruined. However, Houphouet-Boigny’s daughter later got married to Blaise Campaore, who 
became Head of State of Burkina Faso in 1987. Hence paving the way for an anti-Doe alliance 
to be formed by these countries (Walraven, 1999). It is in view of this, that Burkina Faso 
became the base for training NPFL combatants and further supplied arms to Taylor. Also, with 
the availability of iron ore and tropical timber in Liberia, the support from these countries 
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implied that they could get easy access to exploit Monrovia’s natural resources. As such, 
Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire opposed the ECOWAS intervention from the onset of the crisis. 
4.3.1 Legality of the Intervention 
Prior to the Liberian civil war, ECOWAS had adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression and 
the PMAD. The former protocol could not have provided a justification for the intervention 
since it was only concerned with inter-state conflicts (Kufour, 1993). The PMAD however 
provided a basis on which ECOWAS could intervene. The protocol allowed for the 
organization to intervene in conflicts, provided such dissensions were externally induced. 
Nonetheless, a recourse to this protocol as the legal basis for the intervention would be 
questionable, since the institutions stipulated by the protocol to redress conflicts had not been 
established at the time ECOWAS intervened (Walraven, 1999). As stated in chapter three, the 
PMAD made it permissible for decisions regarding military interventions to be taken and 
implemented by the Defence Council with the assistance of the Defence Commission. As such, 
a decision to intervene taken by any institution other than the aforementioned contravenes the 
blocs existing legal and procedural standards. Hence, making it untenable for the protocol to 
be alluded as a justification for the intervention. Again, article 16 of the PMAD stipulated that, 
a request for sub-regional intervention in a conflict should be channelled through the 
chairperson of ECOWAS. However, Doe submitted his request through the Chairman of the 
SMC, hence further making it indefensible for the PMAD to be used as a reference point for 
the intervention (Howe, 1996). Again, the SMC’s claim to be acting on behalf of the authority 
seem to have been ultra vires, considering the fact that the Authority only explicitly sanctioned 
the SMC’s decision in November 1990 after ECOMOG had already intervened (Ero, 1995).  
In any case, the PMAD permits regional intervention in domestic conflicts only if the uprising 
is supported and sustained by an external force. In view of this, the community could have 
intervened legitimately if it had proven that there was an external entity supporting the NPFL 
or any of the other factions. However, there were no attempts by the Authority to probe and 
authenticate the claim that the war was being supported and sustained from outside, hence 
making it difficult for the above article to be used as a justification for the intervention (Kufour, 
1993). 
The UN Charter allows for regional organizations to be involved in conflict management 
provided such crisis threatens international security (Ofodile, 1994). That notwithstanding, 
regional organizations are required by the Charter to subject any such interventions to the 
approval of the UN Security Council (UNSC). This renders any intervention with the barking 
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of the UNSC morally and legally acceptable. In view of this, the ECOWAS intervention cannot 
be regarded as legal since it was not explicitly sanctioned by the UNSC. Ofodile (1994) argues 
that, the ECOWAS operation in Liberia could have been consistent with international law 
provided the purpose of the operation was limited to peacekeeping. This, he argues is because, 
peacekeeping operations do not necessarily require the permission of the UNSC, since all 
parties involved in the conflict must consent to the operation. However, the dispatch of 
ECOMOG was without the consent of all parties involved in the conflict, hence undermining 
the acceptability of the intervention. This was further aggravated by the fact that ECOMOG 
deviated from peacekeeping into peace enforcement.  
Also, the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States by the UN General Assembly emphasizes the need for the 
international community to refrain from intruding in the internal affairs of states (UN, 1970). 
The document further conceives force as an unacceptable means of settling international issues 
and a contravention of international law. Similarly, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention and Interference in Internal Affairs of States also prohibits any state or group of 
states from ‘interfering in any form or for any reason’ in the internal affairs of other states (UN, 
1981). From these Declarations and the UN Charter, the ECOWAS intervention was 
problematic, especially because ECOMOG became a belligerent in the war at some point in 
the conflict. Again, there is no justification within international law to support the claim that a 
conflict which results in a refugee crisis threatens international peace and security, hence 
meriting external intervention. All these reasons render the intervention illegal, at least 
according to international customary law. 
4.4 The ECOWAS Conflict Management Strategy in Liberia 
The SMC adopted a dual approach that intended to end the conflict and reinstate a 
constitutionally elected government. The ECOWAS Peace Plan (EPP) served as the framework 
that guided the organization in its quest to achieve the aforementioned objectives. The 
committee took an unprecedented decision to establish and dispatch a peacekeeping mission 
into Liberia, named ECOMOG (Ero, 1995).  
Among others, the EPP was geared towards appealing to the warring factions to observe a 
ceasefire in order to pave way for the restoration of peace and security in the country (Howe, 
1996). The SMC further intended on establishing a broad-based interim government as well as 
conduct free and fair elections within 12 months (Arowolo, 2015). The approach adopted by 
ECOWAS was therefore aimed at dissuading the parties to the conflict from leveraging 
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violence as a means to achieving their goals and rather offer a peaceful conduit through which 
their grievances could be resolved. The organization’s recourse to military intervention was 
however aimed at deterring the warring factions from keeping up with their viciousness. 
4.4.1 The Military Approach 
On 24 August 1990, ECOMOG, comprising 3000 troops was dispatched into Monrovia. The 
size of the troops however increased significantly to 9000 in 1991 and 16000 in 1993 (Pitts, 
1999). The mandate of ECOMOG was to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire as 
stipulated in the EPP and also to restore law and order into Liberia, as well as keeping the peace 
in the country (Bøås, 2010). From this, the mandate of ECOMOG signifies that of a 
peacekeeping force. An assertion that is further evident in the name of the sub-regional force- 
‘…cease-fire monitoring group’ (Walraven, 1999). That notwithstanding, the restoration of law 
and order included in the mandate of ECOMOG implicitly ascribed a peace-enforcement role 
to the mission (ibid). Although the operation of ECOMOG was envisioned to be short, the 
presence of the multinational force in Liberia lasted longer than expected. Between 1990 and 
1998, ECOMOG was involved in a variety of activities including, the ‘protection of 
humanitarian aid, disarming of factions and peace-enforcement operations among others’ 
(Tuck, 2000). 
The first challenge arising from the intervention pertains to the absence of consensus regarding 
the deployment of ECOMOG at the regional level and among the warring factions (Tarr, 1993). 
At the regional level, some member states of the community vehemently opposed the 
intervention. In the absence of a legal instrument legitimating the intervention, Burkina Faso 
argued for member states to reach a consensus prior to the deployment of the troops (Walraven, 
1999). Senegal and Togo on the other hand expressed concern over the non-involvement of all 
member states in the decision leading to the deployment of the so-called regional force. Mali 
on the other hand indicated that the SMC had violated its mandate. In view of this, Togo and 
Mali refrained from contributing troops towards the operation (Pitts, 1999). Similarly, Taylor’s 
NPFL perceived ECOMOG as an invasion force, hence intensifying its hostilities towards the 
multinational force. Taylor’s position was premised on the grounds that, at the time of the 
intervention, the NPFL controlled over 90 percent of the Liberian territory. With Taylor 
envisioning a quick victory, he saw the intervention as undermining the sovereignty of the 
Liberian people (Sesay, 1996). As such, the decision to intervene was shrouded with 
controversies that could have been avoided had the regional group taken an unbiased and 
objective approach towards the conflict. The dissension surrounding the deployment of 
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ECOMOG adversely affected the commitment of member states towards resolving the conflict 
and rendered cooperation from the NPFL difficult to attain. 
In terms of peacekeeping, ECOMOG encountered significant challenges in its operations. This 
was to be expected as the countries that contributed troops to the operation lacked expertise in 
peacekeeping (Adeleke, 1995). A significant component of peacekeeping operations is the trust 
and willingness of belligerents to cooperate with the intervening force. This can only be 
attained if the force is perceived as neutral, impartial and legitimate (Kennedy, 2018). These 
conditions were however absent at the time of the intervention. Also, with Taylor’s intention 
not only to fight but to frustrate the peacekeeping force, the conditions for a successful 
peacekeeping operation was absent. In fact, there was no peace to keep at the time ECOMOG 
was deployed into Monrovia (Tuck, 2000). Added to the above, peacekeeping operations do 
not only thrive on the capacity of the force to reach a cease fire agreement. But transcends that 
to include lessening the capacity of belligerents to resume combats after a cease-fire pact is 
signed. However, due to the competing interest involved in the conflict, especially between 
Ghana and Nigeria on the one hand and Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire on the other, arriving 
at a ‘post cease-fire objective’ became daunting (Arowolo, 2015).  
Further, another challenge encountered by ECOMOG related to its peace enforcement 
approach. In order to undertake a successful peace enforcement operation, it is incumbent that 
the multinational force has a leader that is willing to take responsibility, direct and guide the 
mission. It also requires that the peace enforcement force has a higher military capability in 
comparison with the target (Zartman, 1989: Eke, 2010). However, in the case of ECOWAS, 
these conditions were not fulfilled. Particularly, Nigeria proved itself as a domineering leader 
in the operation with most decisions taken unilaterally by Abuja. This was not surprising as 
Nigeria contributed the highest in terms of funding for the operation as well as troops. For 
instance, as at February 1995, the ECOMOG troops numbered a little over 8000 with Nigeria 
providing almost 5000 of the troops (Tuck, 2000). Abuja also contributed about 70 percent of 
the funds for the operation (ibid). As such, Nigeria seemingly dominated every facet of the 
operation including championing attempts at soliciting for funds from Western donors as well 
as representing the organization in the United Nations (Afolabi, 2017 ). Not only did Nigeria 
contribute the highest number of troops, Nigerians also dominated the senior positions in 
ECOMOG (Jimoh, 2014). Nigeria’s overly domineering role resulted in the lack of a united 
front for the operation as most of the participating countries were highly discontented with the 
former’s actions. In particular, Abuja’s unilateral decision to replace the Ghanaian Force 
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Commander- Lt. General Arnold Quainoo, with a Nigerian, Major General Joshua Dogonyaro- 
sparked up controversy and resentment among the contributing states (Tarr, 1993). As such, a 
unanimous approach for the peaceful resolution of the conflict was almost impossible to attain. 
On the contrary, Nigeria could have adopted a diplomatic approach in its leadership, centred 
on pursuing the interest and common good of all member states of ECOWAS. This approach 
would have rendered the intervention less tense and supported by the community. 
Furthermore, for any peacekeeping operation to be successful, it is relevant that the intervening 
force possess an in-depth understanding of the socio-cultural dynamics, politics, economy as 
well as the demography of the country its intervening in (Howe, 1996). This cannot be 
underestimated as most conflicts are complex. In view of this, an effectual conflict resolution 
requires a better understanding of the context within which the war is occurring. Understanding 
the context is also important because it serves as the basis for determining the strategies and 
approach to be adopted in resolving the conflict. However, in the case of the ECOWAS 
intervention, the force lacked sufficient knowledge about Liberia (Mareike, 2015). It is due to 
this that ECOMOG underestimated the conflict in all its ramifications as well as the capacity 
of the NPFL. Contrary to the perception of the leaders of ECOWAS that the intervention would 
be ‘a short surgical police action’, the conflict lasted over a longer period of time and proved 
to be extremely difficult to resolve (Ofodile, 1994). From this, it is quite evident that ECOMOG 
did not prepare adequately prior to arriving in Monrovia and as such became weary with time. 
Closely linked to this is the logistical challenges the operation frequently run into. Walraven 
(1999) argues that ECOMOG lacked the needed equipment, communication and intelligence 
to enhance the success of the operation. Interestingly, the operation lacked a detailed map of 
Liberia to aid its navigation of the country and radios to enhance communication in the event 
of attacks. Similarly, some of the troops arrived in Liberia without their personal arsenals 
(Tuck, 2000). In other instances where the various contingents brought their own weaponry, 
there was a challenge with compatibility in terms of usage of the distinct weapons, some of 
which were obtained from the West and others the Eastern bloc during the cold war (Ero, 1995).  
Also, as a result of poor culture of maintenance, most of the available military equipment were 
not in the right shape to be used for the intervention. Considering Liberia’s topography which 
is predominantly forest and mountains, a lack of weaponry on the part of ECOMOG gave room 
for the rebels to have a leeway with their guerrilla tactics (Bøås, 2010). The lack of air 
capability by the regional force greatly affected the operations counter-insurgency strategy. 
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Also, due to the lack of consensus on the operation, ECOMOG lacked the needed manpower 
to enable the force to realize its mandate of peacekeeping and later peace-enforcement. Most 
of the member states of the community either lacked personnel or were constrained by the cost 
of financing their troops (Pitts, 1999). Due to this, checkpoints were usually too far apart to 
ensure effective monitoring of the cease-fire. It is in view of this that ECOMOG could only 
protect Monrovia but not enforce peace in the rest of the country, especially the hinterlands 
(Sessay, 1996). The challenge encountered by ECOMOG in this sphere is not new to 
international peacekeeping operations. This is especially true for regional and sub-regional 
organizations in developing countries. However, this challenge could have been avoided had 
the international community shown keen interest and provided financial support for the 
operation. 
Added to the above, another challenge to the operation was the compromised neutrality of 
ECOMOG (Ofuatey‐Kodjoe, 2007). Successful peacekeeping operations require the neutrality 
of the intervention force in order to attain the trust of the belligerents. However, ECOMOG 
took sides in the conflict, hence rendering the peacekeepers belligerents in the war (Okyere, 
2014). This could be attributed in some regard to Nigeria’s quest to completely defeat the 
NPFL. Although many factions emerged in the course of the conflict, the main target of 
ECOMOG was the NPFL. It is in view of this that Taylor refused to disarm his men and 
conform to the terms of agreements signed during the mediation process (Tuck, 2000).  
Moreover, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) and the Armed Forces 
of Liberia (AFL), both parties to the conflict, fought alongside ECOMOG (Howe, 1996). Since 
these factions did not have the military capability to challenge ECOMOG, they opted to 
collaborate with the regional force against the NPLF- their common enemy (Tarr, 1993). The 
INPFL assisted ECOMOG with combat and intelligence in order to enable the regional force 
to permeate the swamps of Monrovia (ibid). In exchange, the former was given some privileges 
including armed access into ECOMOG’s headquarters (Kennedy, 2018). It is as a result of 
these collaborations that Samuel Doe was arrested and murdered by the INPFL in the 
ECOMOG headquarters. In addition, these rebel groups received ammunitions from the 
regional force.  
The Nigerian-led force adopted this approach as a way of cutting down on its financial cost 
and casualties as well as to increase pressure on the NPFL (Pitts, 1999). The focus of ECOMOG 
on the NPFL resulted in the mission overlooking other potential solutions to the conflict as 
55 
 
well as the role of the other factions in fuelling the conflict. By supporting some factions to the 
conflict, ECOMOG made it extremely difficult to realize peace (Howe, 1996). Most 
importantly, by supporting these warlords, ECOMOG covertly expressed support for the 
human right abuses perpetrated by these factions, hence tainting the reputation of ECOWAS. 
Eventually, the approach adopted by the regional force could not prevent Taylor from ceding 
power. It also made it extremely difficult for ECOMOG to be trusted with monitoring the cease-
fire, demobilizing and disarming the parties to the conflict (Tarr, 1993). In view of this, 
ECOMOG’s presence in Monrovia prolonged rather than shortened the conflict. 
The troops were also involved in some malpractices including corruption and profiteering 
(Howe, 1996). Although Liberians expressed gratitude for the intervention that saved their 
lives, they were displeased with the conduct of some ECOMOG personnel. Whereas the 
contingent from Ghana and elsewhere earned an honourable reputation, some other troops 
including those from Nigeria tarnished the stature of ECOWAS (Brown, 1999). It is based on 
this that the operation was dubbed by some Liberians as ‘Every Car or Moving Object Gone’ 
(Tuck, 2000). These malpractices could however be attributed to the fact that junior officers in 
the Nigerian contingent usually went unpaid for months. In order to make up for this, some 
personnel resorted to taking bribe, extorting civilians, and pilfering humanitarian supplies 
(Kennedy, 2018). A case in point was the looting of the LIMINCO iron refinery to the tune of 
50 million dollars, at a time when the area was a restricted zone under the surveillance of 
ECOMOG (ibid). Also, some ECOMOG troops aided belligerents to transport stolen goods 
and further made ammunitions available to them (Tuck, 2000). Nicholas Burns, former US 
State Department spokesman summarizes the misconduct of the troops this way, “ECOMOG 
troops have been heavily involved since the day they arrived in ripping off Liberians, in looting 
goods and in dealing in contraband” (Salami, 2014).  
4.4.2 The Diplomatic Approach (Peace-making) 
The resolution of the Liberian crisis did not only entail military tactics but also a vigorous 
peace-making process. The diplomatic process comprised of ECOWAS convening several 
peace talks as well as national conferences within and outside Liberia (Sessay, 1996). For the 
purposes of this thesis, there will be no detailed exploration of the mediation processes adopted. 
The study will, however, be concerned with the challenges encountered in the process. 
Prior to the involvement of ECOWAS in the mediation of the crisis, there had been attempts 
by the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC) and the Inter-religious Council of Liberia to 
bring the warring factions to the negotiating table (Mustapha, A & Okyere F, 2014). Mediation 
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efforts by the IFMC, though unsuccessful, provided a viable ground for ECOWAS to take over. 
The initial efforts at brokering peace in Liberia were unsuccessful due to the ‘unreasonable 
preconditions’ put forth by the NPFL for negotiating the crisis (ibid). Taylor’s stance was 
unduly influenced by the lack of neutrality on the part of ECOWAS. In all, fourteen peace 
agreements were brokered by ECOWAS between 1990 and 1997 (Kieh, 2004). The enormous 
number of peace agreements reflects the complexity of the conflict and the daunting task 
imposed on ECOWAS as the mediator. Notwithstanding, the ECOWAS mediation efforts took 
place at different stages of the conflict and involved a wide range of actors including the OAU 
and UN.  
After adopting the EPP, the SMC failed on three occasions -Bamako (1990) , Lome (1991) and 
Monrovia, (1991)- to get Taylor to concur to the Peace Plan (Kennedy, 2018). Amidst these 
failures, the negotiation process was handed over to the Committee of Five, headed by the 
Ivorian President (Brown, 1999). There was however a significant challenge with the Ivorian 
President leading the negotiations as he opposed the intervention at the early stages of the 
conflict. With his incessant support to the NPFL, his neutrality in the negotiation process was 
questionable. This is, however, a flaw of the sub-regional group as it failed to realize the impact 
such biased mediators could have on the peace process. It was therefore not surprising that the 
Yamoussoukro and Geneva meetings organized by the committee could not end the conflict 
(ibid). 
One of the challenges encountered during the peace process was the lack of logistics, funding 
and technical capacity (Okyere, 2014). External entities that offered to finance the process did 
so in pursuit of their parochial interest and further adopted the ‘carrot and stick’ approach 
(Bøås, 2010). Again, considering the fact that the Liberian civil war marked a new era of 
conflicts, most member states of the community were lax in supporting the peace talks with 
their scarce resources. Also, due to the lack of a formal structure and a well-established 
procedure to facilitate the mediation and negotiation process, most of the efforts of the SMC 
were based on ad hoc arrangements (Okyere, 2014). These arrangements were usually slowed 
as the SMC juggled supervising the ECOMOG operations with the diplomatic processes 
together. 
Another challenge encountered during the mediation process was a lack of clarity on the 
definition and end goal the negotiation was expected to achieve (Ero, 1995). This could be 
attributed to the divergent perspectives from which the various parties and actors perceived the 
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conflict, ‘depending on their interest and negotiating positions’ (Tuck, 2000). This unduly 
prolonged the conflict and resulted in the emergence of other splinter and rebel groups. This 
phenomenon could also be attributed to the lack of a monitoring mechanism put in place to 
ensure that peace-agreements were adhered to. This constantly undermined peace pacts as there 
were always new parties to the conflict with varying interest and positions (Kieh, 2004).  
The situation was further complicated with some factions doubting the neutrality of ECOWAS. 
This rendered confidence building between the various belligerents almost impossible to reach 
in the mediation process. Okyere (2014) argues that, at the onset of the conflict, ECOWAS was 
much more interested in reaching a paper-based consensus just to prove to the world that it had 
been able to arrive at a peace agreement rather than fostering trust and confidence among the 
signatories to the pact. Subsequently, after the peace agreements had been signed, the factions 
resumed fighting.  It is therefore not surprising that until the involvement of the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in the mediation process, ECOWAS could not achieve a lasting 
peace. 
Further, a successful mediation requires that all parties to a conflict recognize the adverse 
impact a unilateral solution could have on the negotiation process (Kennedy, 2018). Such 
solutions either result in a stalemate during the process or the abortion of the process in its 
entirety by the disaffected party (ibid). Since Taylor controlled a greater part of Liberia prior 
to the intervention, he did not deem it prudent to make concessions to any other solutions 
proposed during the negotiations (Walraven, 1999). Similarly, with ECOWAS playing a 
crucial role in the formation of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), the IGNU 
capitalized on its legitimacy in order not to make compromises (Afolabi, 2017 ). Since the 
IGNU received the unwavering support of ECOWAS, it made it practically difficult for the 
belligerents to recognize the depth of the mayhem the Liberian people were going through and 
the need for a peace agreement to be reached and respected by all parties.  
Nevertheless, although Taylor initially presented a unilateral position, he later presented 
alternative proposals (Ofodile, 1994). Taylor’s new stance reflected the warlord’s willingness 
to disarm his militia under the auspices of the UN, on condition that all other factions would 
do same (ibid). This was understandable, considering the assassination of Doe under the watch 
of ECOMOG. However, this proposal which could have potentially shortened the span of the 
war was rejected by ECOWAS. From this, it appeared that ECOWAS had taken an entrenched 
position, hence making it difficult for other alternatives to be considered. This reemphasized 
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Taylor’s initial assertion that ECOWAS only sought to deny him the opportunity to accede to 
power. Prior to this, the NPFL and all the other rebel groups had been excluded from the interim 
government through the provisions of the EPP. This conflicted with the interest of Taylor as 
he waged war only as a means to capture state power. It is in view of this that Taylor formed 
his own government in Gbarnga shortly after the 1991 Bamako peace agreement (Pitts, 1999). 
The diplomatic process was therefore stifled by ECOWAS’ inability to create a conducive 
environment for the negotiations to take place in good faith. The sub-regional organization thus 
became a part of the problem rather than the solution. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned with the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. Among others, 
the chapter explored the factors precipitating the war and identified the oligarchic rule of the 
Americo-Liberians as the root cause and Doe’s bad governance as the proximate motivation 
for the insurrection. The chapter further examined some challenges encountered by ECOWAS 
in its diplomatic and military strategies. The first of such challenges pertained to the lack of a 
legal justification for the intervention. The chapter also explored other challenges encountered 
by ECOMOG including the lack of neutrality of the force, the excessive dominance of Nigeria 
in the operation and the logistical and financial challenges encountered by the force. The last 
section examined some challenges encountered in the mediation process. The next chapter 
explores the ECOWAS intervention in Cote d’Ivoire.  
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                                           CHAPTER FIVE 
ECOWAS AND THE POST-ELECTION CRISIS IN COTE D’IVOIRE, 2010-
2011 
5.1 Introduction 
The conflict in Liberia marked a new phase of turbulence in West Africa. Although ECOWAS 
hoped the successful resolution of the crisis could usher the region into a new era of peace and 
stability, it was rather the beginning of a long and painstaking attempt to prevent the 
deterioration of the sub-region’s fragile security. After mediating between the various factions 
in the first Ivorian civil war, ECOWAS and its international partners were optimistic that the 
2010 elections would seal efforts at stabilizing the world’s leading cocoa producer. 
Unfortunately, the outcome of the election turned into a nightmare that did not only haunt Ivory 
Coast but the rest of West Africa and the international community. The role of ECOWAS in 
the post-election crisis in Ivory Coast is unique in many respects. Unlike previous interventions 
where the regional bloc dispatched a peacekeeping mission, there was no military intervention 
in Yamoussoukro. Also, whereas other conflicts in the sub-region had been ignored by the 
international community, the crisis in Ivory Coast attracted the attention of various 
international actors. Further, for the first time, the capacity of ECOWAS to challenge the 
legitimacy of a de facto president was brought to light. This chapter exposes the challenges 
encountered by ECOWAS in its intervention in Cote d’Ivoire. The chapter consist of four 
sections. The first section discusses the background to the conflict. Section two evaluates the 
role of France, AU and the UN in resolving the conflict. Section three probes the challenges 
encountered by ECOWAS from the diplomatic standpoint and the last section analyses’ why 
military intervention was desirable but could not be implemented by ECOWAS.   
5.2 Background to the conflict 
The root cause of the post-election violence in Cote d’Ivoire is intricate and multi-dimensional. 
After gaining independence from the French, the government of Felix Houphouet-Boigny 
championed the efficacious utilization of state lands by all residents of the country, regardless 
of their citizenship status (Zounmenou, 2011). Despite this initiative, Houphouet-Boigny’s 
regime was excessively dominated by the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI). Although 
the regime suppressed political opposition and did not uphold the tenets of good governance, 
the country’s hospitality towards migrants paved the way for an influx of foreigners into Ivory 
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Coast. These migrants augmented the country’s labour deficit, hence contributing towards Cote 
d’Ivoire’s economic development (ibid). Houphouet-Boigny, however, became the central 
figure around whom socio-economic and political activities in the country revolved 
(Novosseloff, 2018). It is in view of this that although the country lacked well-functioning 
institutional structures, yet the regime managed to resolve all conflicts of interest that could 
have resulted in the deterioration of the state. That notwithstanding, the later part of 
Houphouet-Boigny’s government was stifled by economic crises and a call for democratization 
and social reform (Abatan, 2016). Upon his death in December 1993, Konan Bedie- speaker of 
the National Assembly- assumed the role of president.  
Bedie deviated significantly from his predecessor in terms of the inclusivity of people of non-
Ivorian descent in the governance process. He introduced a myopic conception of citizenship 
based on a populist policy known as Ivoirité (Akpokpari, 2008). This policy was geared 
towards excluding his political rival, Allasane Dramane Ouattara, from participating in the 
1995 elections (Doyle, 2010). The policy was targeted at the many immigrants residing in the 
country, especially the Burkinabe’s, who formed a greater percentage of foreigners in Cote 
d’Ivoire. The Ivoirite policy rendered citizens who were not indigenous Ivorians ineligible for 
presidency.  
Prior to this, Ivory Coast was a beacon of stability and development in the very chaotic sub-
region. However, the ‘segregationist’ policy polarized the country and resulted in social unease, 
contrary to what Bedie expected. Consequently, Bedie’s administration was overthrown in a 
coup d’état in 1999 - the country’s first unconstitutional change of government (Cook, 2011). 
However, General Robert Guei, the leader of the junta, did not immediately restore democracy 
in the country, hence resulting in a mass revolt which led to Laurent Gbagbo taking over as 
president (Momodu, 2018). At this time, the stability in the country had been compromised, 
hence paving way for future unrest. Due to this, an attempt to topple Gbagbo’s regime in 2002 
resulted in a civil war. The conflict led to the northern territory being controlled by rebel groups 
and the south by the government. The international community employed diplomacy as a 
mechanism for resolving the conflict. In all, about ten peace agreements were reached 
(Momodu, 2018). The Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d’Ivoire (PAPP) and 
the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (OPA) signed in 2005 and 2007 respectively were 
instrumental towards resolving the conflict.  
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In addressing the citizenship quandary, the OPA resolved to permit Ouattara to contest 
elections although the constitution prohibited individuals with a non-Ivorian ancestry from 
contesting elections. The poll was however postponed five times in six years (Abatan, 2016). 
Despite the delays, a significant aspect of the peace pact that aimed at disarming, demobilizing 
and reintegrating (DDR) combatants was not completely achieved before the 2010 elections, 
due to the lack of trust among the factions (Ramis, 2011). A ceremonial DDR was however 
held under the auspices of external partners. That notwithstanding, both factions ‘continued to 
rearm’ ahead of the election (ibid). Despite this and other logistical challenges encountered, 
the election was not postponed for the seventh time. The poll was contested by Gbagbo, 
Ouattara and Bedie, among eleven other candidates. The first round of elections held on 31 
October 2010 was successful and occurred within a relatively stable and peaceful condition. In 
this regard, international observers lauded the election as being free and fair (Doyle, 2010). At 
the end of the poll, none of the fourteen candidates won an outright majority. However, Gbagbo 
was in the lead with 38.3% of the votes. The voting was however greatly influenced by ethnic, 
religious and regional affiliations (Novosseloff, 2018). Ahead of the runoff election, Bedie 
campaigned and vehemently supported Ouattara, hence limiting Gbagbo’s chances of winning 
(BBC, 2019).  
After the 28 November run-off election, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) declared 
Ouattara as winner, having garnered 54% of the votes against Gbagbo who accumulated 46% 
of the total votes. The result was upheld by the international community including ECOWAS, 
EU, AU and the UN (Simonen, 2012). Discontented with the outcome, Gbagbo asserted that 
the election was rigged. In view of this, he petitioned the Constitutional Council, which 
subsequently annulled over 600,000 of the votes, mostly from Ouattara’s stronghold. The court 
then declared Gbagbo as the legitimate winner of the poll (Cocks, T & Kpodo, K 2011). The 
ruling was condemned by the international community as it was perceived as an attempt by the 
incumbent to illegitimately cling to power and subvert the will of the people. The stalemate 
emanating from the dispute plunged the already volatile country into another round of violence 
and fighting, leading to many casualties and the displacement of thousands. The combat was 
spearheaded by Gbagbo’s supporters against the followers of Ouattara. The latter on the other 
hand aligned himself with the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire, former combatants in the 
first civil war (Kode, 2016).  
As the fighting ensued, Gbagbo ordered the French and UN peacekeepers to evacuate the 
country and further banned their aircrafts from flying through the airspace of Ivory Coast (Watt, 
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2011). The UN forces however flaunted the order. By March 2011, the country was at the brink 
of experiencing another civil war. Towards the end of March, pro-Ouattara forces launched 
military attacks across the country, in an attempt to topple Gbagbo. That notwithstanding, this 
did not deter Gbagbo from relinquishing power. In early April 2011, pro-Gbagbo forces 
indiscriminately attacked UN troops in Abidjan, triggering a response from the international 
force. Due to the hostilities, UN forces, acting under security council mandate to prevent the 
use of heavy weapons against civilians launched a military offensive against Gbagbo’s troops 
(BBC, 2019). This however did not dissuade Gbagbo’s militia from carrying out attacks against 
civilians and other stakeholders in the conflict. The conflict culminated on 11 April 2011, when 
pro-Ouattara forces aided by French troops arrested Gbagbo.   
5.3 The role of international actors in the crisis 
From the onset of the first civil war, the international community had been committed to 
ensuring a successful democratic transition in Cote d’Ivoire. Beyond ECOWAS, other regional 
organizations such as the EU and AU as well as the UN and France were actively involved in 
the conduct of the elections and the aftermath crisis that emerged. The interest of the 
international community in the crisis is attributable to the fact that, prior to 2010, the country 
had experienced a civil war, hence making it imperative for the international community to 
prevent the outbreak of another conflict. Again, with the country still polarized along ethnic 
and religious lines, it was necessary that international organizations intervened as early as 
possible in order to prevent the occurrence of a possible genocide. Perhaps, this was as a result 
of lessons learnt from the 1994 Rwandan genocide where the international community blatantly 
ignored the plight of civilians in the East African country. As such, the role of the international 
community in resolving the conflict cannot be underestimated. Arguably, the conflict would 
have prolonged and resulted in an incalculable humanitarian crisis had international actors not 
responded swiftly.  
5.3.1 ECOWAS 
On its part, ECOWAS swiftly accepted the results declared by IEC, hence legitimising 
Ouattara’s victory. This approach by the sub-regional organization was criticized initially by 
Thabo Mbeki, the lead mediator for the AU (Obi, 2011). The position of the sub-regional 
organization presupposed that the election was free, fair and without irregularities. However, 
it was common knowledge that the election was flawed to some extent due to the initial 
challenges encountered by IEC (Kode, 2016). Based on the flaws in the electoral process, 
ECOWAS should have been opened to embracing any grievances expressed by the contestants 
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in order to ascertain the best possible way to resolve it. Gbagbo’s recommendation for a recount 
of the ballot papers was quickly dismissed by ECOWAS (Cook, 2011). It was due to this that 
ECOWAS was perceived as biased, hence making Gbagbo intransigent to their demands. The 
lack of neutrality appears to be a common trend in ECOWAS’ conflict management approach. 
In Liberia, ECOWAS similarly disregarded the proposals of Taylor, hence unduly prolonging 
the conflict as discussed in chapter four.  
Moreover, with ECOWAS and its partners condemning the decision of the court, it undermined 
the credibility of the judicial system as well as the constitution of Ivory Coast. The challenge 
emanating from the stance of ECOWAS pertains to which institutions have the legitimate 
authority to pronounce victors and losers of elections. Did the position of the international 
community superintend over the decision of the court? At a glance, it appears that the position 
of the international community was appropriate in safeguarding the countries democracy. 
However, a deeper analysis of the issue exposes the challenges that this approach poses to 
democracy, especially due to the precedence it sets in Africa.  
That notwithstanding, the prompt response of ECOWAS reflects the organizations keen 
interest in ensuring that democratic values are upheld and respected by member states. It further 
exhibits the sub-regional organizations quest to prevent Ivory Coast from resurging into 
conflict and an attempt to climax its conflict management in the country. The decision of 
ECOWAS also evinced impeccable leadership in a region where ‘presidential solidarity’ 
usually overrides the ‘will and aspirations of citizens’ (Zounmenou, 2011).    
5.3.2 African Union  
The African Union on its part endorsed the position of ECOWAS, albeit, after the outcome of 
the election had been probed by the continental organization. The initial response of the AU 
was to initiate mediation processes to resolve the conflict. The approach was however 
unsuccessful (Ramis, 2011). The failure of the AU mediation efforts can be attributed to the 
inability of the organization to identify the right person to lead its ‘diplomatic engagements’ 
(Kode, 2016). On his part, Mbeki acting as the mediator for the AU returned from Abidjan only 
calling for peace whereas Raila Odinga had stated prior to his appointment as mediator that 
Gbagbo must be forced to relinquish power, hence tainting his reputation as a neutral mediator.  
Later in February 2011, the Peace and Security Council of AU created an ad hoc high-level 
panel headed by the president of Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, to find a political 
solution to the crisis (Cocks T & Kpodo, K 2011). Members of the committee included the 
64 
 
presidents of Chad, Burkina Faso, South Africa and Tanzania. The panel proposed four 
measures to resolve the conflict. These included, ‘support for a national unity government 
headed by Ouattara’, the assurance of a dignified exit for Gbagbo; restructuring of some state 
institutions including the military, electoral commission and the constitutional council as well 
as the establishment of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission (Cook, 2011). A 
communique published by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) reaffirmed the 
organizations stance on the need for a political resolution to the crisis (AU, 2011). The council 
also requested for the appointment of a high representative to superintend over the 
implementation of the mechanisms adopted to resolve the crisis. As well as a two weeks’ 
timeframe during which parties to the conflict would develop ‘modalities for the 
implementation of the proposals’ (ibid). Due to the unwavering posture of parties to the 
conflict, especially Gbabgo and his cronies, the enforcement of the AU resolution was 
adversely hindered.  
Although the proposals from the panel of five were very relevant and necessary for resolving 
the crisis, nonetheless, the AU’s inclination to the formation of a unity government appears to 
show the organizations wavering support for Ouattara. Unsurprisingly, the organizations 
posture was only a reflection of its tradition of proposing for a unity government in most 
disputed elections that threatens peace on the continent. Prior to the post-election violence in 
Ivory Coast, the AU’s ‘one size fit all’ recommendation had been presented to Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, where the strategy failed. Perhaps, this reflects the solidarity among some heads of 
states of the continental body towards Gbagbo. Again, the AU did not make a backup plan in 
case the diplomatic approach it adopted failed. This is due to the lack of capacity on the part of 
the organization to resort to military intervention as a means of ending the massacre. It is 
noteworthy that, the recommendations proposed by the organization could only be 
implemented after the intransigent Gbagbo had been forcefully removed from office (Ramis, 
2011).  
5.3.3 United Nations 
The UN played a significant, if not leading role, in the resolution of the conflict. The United 
Nations’ Operations in Cote d’ivoire (UNOCI) had been involved in peacekeeping activities in 
the West African country since 2004 (Simonen, 2012). UNOCI had a unique mandate of 
certifying the outcome of the 2010 elections as stipulated in security council resolution 1603 
of 2005 (Novosseloff, 2018). Although UNOCI was mandated to certify the elections, it had 
no responsibility or so ever in the organization of the poll. Thus, it only played the role of a 
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certifier and not an actor in the elections (Doyle, 2010). UNOCI’s role was geared towards 
‘guaranteeing the credibility of the elections’ in terms of the electoral process as well as the 
outcome of the poll (ibid). In other words, UNOCI’s responsibility was to ensure that the looser 
of the election accepts defeat (Watt, 2011). With the UN leading the certification process, it 
was anticipated that the outcome of the election would not be disputed. This however turned 
out to be an illusion as the UN-certified results was contested by Gbagbo. As stated earlier, the 
controversy emanating from international organizations validating or invalidating the outcome 
of an election has to do with whether the position of these organizations supersedes the 
decisions of state institutions. It is in view of this that Gbagbo fiercely resisted the operations 
of UNOCI as he classified it as the culmination of an imperialist agenda against Cote d’Ivoire 
(ibid).  
Most peace agreements facilitated by the UN in countries experiencing conflicts are usually 
focused on realizing a transition to democracy. The flaw with this strategy is that, elections are 
usually envisioned as a means to end conflicts. This notion fails to recognize that election is 
only a means to an end and not an end in itself. As such, elections may be necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for realizing a lasting peace. With regards to the Ivorian context, the UN 
and the other international organizations involved in the peace processes were oblivious of the 
need for a post-election deal that would be satisfactory to all parties to the conflict (Zounmenou, 
2011). In view of this, the ‘winner takes all’ approach adopted prior to the elections made it 
almost impossible for the post-election crisis to be avoided (Cook, 2011). That 
notwithstanding, the use of force by UNOCI in collaboration with the French troops 
contributed immensely towards preventing the crisis from escalating and ultimately restored 
law and order to the country.  
5.3.3 France 
Due to the many constraints UNOCI was confronted with, Paris became an indispensable actor 
in resolving the conflict. In April 2011, French troops, acting under the banner of Operation 
Lincorne were dispatched to Ivory Coast to assist UNOCI (UNSC, 2011). France’s 
involvement in conflicts in Africa, especially among the Francophone states is nothing new. 
Paris’ engagement with its formal colonies is influenced and sustained by the historical, 
linguistic, cultural and economic ties that exist between Paris and its formal colonies (ACLED, 
2015). Prior to 2010, French military personnel had been deployed to Ivory Coast in 2002, 
based on a bilateral agreement between the two countries (Okyere, 2014). However, as the 
post-election crisis loomed, the UN Secretary General requested for Lincorne to aid UNOCI in 
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carrying out its mandate (Kode, 2016). The UNSC authorization therefore formed the legal 
basis for the involvement of France in the conflict.  
Despite the UN mandate, France justified its interest in the Ivorian crisis on the basis of 
protecting its citizens and foreign nationals in the war-torn country (Abatan, 2016). Besides 
this, France also endeavoured to protect its economic as well as strategic interest against 
Gbagbo and his Young Patriots who had openly opposed the involvement of France in the 
conflict (Zounmenou, 2011). That notwithstanding, Lincorne did not have the mandate to either 
undertake or support a regime change. This renders Paris’ involvement in the arrest of Gbagbo 
problematic and contentious. Also, this reaffirms Gbagbo’s initial postulation that the presence 
of France in the West African country was to further its neo-imperialist agenda. Critics argue 
that, France leveraged its permanent position on the UNSC to intervene in Ivory Coast in order 
to achieve an outcome that would be favourable to its national interest (Okyere, 2014). The 
extension of the activities of Operation Lincorne beyond its UNSC mandate blurs the line 
between protecting civilians and regime change (ibid). This affirmed the partiality of UNOCI 
and France in resolving the conflict. However, this misdemeanour eluded the attention of the 
international community as the concern of all external actors was to ensure that Gbagbo 
receded power. Nevertheless, Lincorne contributed significantly towards protecting civilians 
and controlling the usage of heavy weapons at a time where security was rapidly deteriorating 
in Cote d’Ivoire.  
5.4 The ECOWAS Conflict Management Approach  
The resurgence of violence in Ivory Coast posed a threat to the region’s peace and security in 
many ways. The spill-over effect of the conflict could have created a refugee crisis in the sub-
region and further threatened the brittle peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire’s 
neighbouring states (Abatan, 2016). Again, to allow Gbagbo to circumvent the will of the 
people, expressed through elections, would have set a precedence that would have undermined 
democracy in the sub-region, as well as the ECOWAS security architecture. It is based on these 
reasons that the ECOWAS intervention was necessary. As the crisis evolved, ECOWAS was 
confronted with two major challenges. The first had to do with how the regional organization 
could develop and pursue a cohesive approach. The second related to how ECOWAS could 
garner the needed resources to aid the resolution of the conflict (Yabi, 2012).   
The immediate response of ECOWAS to the crisis was to call for an extraordinary session on 
7 December 2010, where a decision was taken to suspend Cote d’Ivoire from all ECOWAS 
decision making bodies as well as meetings. To assess later developments in the political and 
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security situation, another Extraordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of States and 
Governments was convened in Abuja on 24 December 2010. At this meeting, the regional bloc 
reiterated its non-negotiable position on the status of Ouattara as the legitimate President of 
Cote d’Ivoire, with reference to the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. In view of 
this, ‘ECOWAS demanded the immediate and peaceful handover of power by Gbagbo to 
Ouattara, in accordance with the expressed wishes of the Ivorian people’ (ECOWAS, 2010). 
ECOWAS further appointed the presidents of Cape Verde, Benin, Burkina Faso and Sierra 
Leone to lead the diplomatic efforts of the organization (Simonen, 2012). Added to the above, 
ECOWAS expressed support for sanctions imposed on Gbagbo which included travel ban, 
freeze on financial assets and all other forms of targeted sanctions imposed by regional 
institutions on the out-going president and his associates. The Central Bank of West African 
States was authorized to block Gbagbo’s access to Cote d’Ivoire’s funds, as a way of making 
it difficult for the government to pay soldiers and public servants (Odobo S.O., et.al, 2016). 
ECOWAS also threatened to use legitimate force to ensure that the will of the Ivorian people 
is respected. 
Although ECOWAS did not intervene militarily, yet its involvement in the crisis was fraught 
with many challenges. Notable among these challenges had to do with the involvement of other 
international institutions in the conflict resolution process. The involvement of different 
multinational organizations in a conflict though helpful, yet could stifle the resolution of the 
crisis if there is a lack of coordination among the distinct actors (Novosseloff, 2018). Primarily, 
this challenge emanates from the overlapping responsibility of all intergovernmental 
organizations to contribute towards the furtherance of international peace and security (Yabi, 
2012). Furthermore, there is a lack of clearly established norm that stipulates the responsibility 
and the kind of interaction that must exist between sub-regional, continental and global 
organizations in any given conflict (ibid). Unarguably, the UN, AU and ECOWAS all have a 
legal and moral obligation to ensure the sub-region’s stability and peace. However, with the 
lack of a clear-cut delineation of responsibilities, confusion became inevitable in the execution 
of their mandates.  
The collaboration between AU and ECOWAS for instance was hindered in a number of ways. 
As stated earlier, the response of ECOWAS after the November round-off election was clear, 
Gbagbo had lost and as such needed to relinquish power immediately. However, the AU 
approached the endorsement of the results in a different manner. The position of the AU was 
unclear until the high-level panel submitted its findings to the PSC in March 2011. This 
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approach perhaps urged Gbagbo on, as he envisioned the possibility of a different response 
from the continental organization, hence his clinging to power until he was forcefully ousted. 
Also, the AU’s recommendation for the formation of a unity government contradicted the 
unflinching position of ECOWAS. The role of ECOWAS in the peace processes was also 
constricted as it was dependent on the finalization of the report of the AU high panel (Odobo, 
S. O, et.al 2016). As such, the delays in the report unduly impinged the efforts of the West 
African bloc in managing the crisis. 
Again, the longstanding geo-political rivalry between the two ‘self-acclaimed hegemons’ on 
the continent, South Africa and Nigeria, was reignited on the question of which country should 
take the lead role in resolving the crisis (Obi, 2011). Prior to this, Nigeria had been instrumental 
in the management of conflicts in the sub-region. Had the AU and its international partners 
reclined from the crisis, Nigeria was likely to have taken the lead role as it has always done in 
resolving conflicts in West Africa. Yabi (2012) argues that, the contention was evident in the 
January 2011 AU summit held in Addis Ababa where tension mounted between the West 
African side headed by Nigeria, Senegal and Burkina Faso and the Southern African side 
headed by South Africa and Angola. Contrary to Nigeria’s position that Gbagbo lost the 
election, South Africa seem to have taken a favourable approach towards Gbagbo hence 
influencing the AU’s proposal for power-sharing between the candidates (Ramis, 2011). 
Further, ECOWAS lambasted South Africa for subverting its efforts by positioning a warship 
outside Abidjan to support Gbagbo, should the sub-regional bloc decide to forcefully remove 
him from power (Okyere, 2014). Although this allegation was denied by the South African 
government, yet the suspicion adversely affected the relations between ECOWAS and AU.  
Moreover, the ECOWAS peace and security architecture developed after the Liberian civil war 
sought to enhance the organization’s capacity to prevent the occurrence of conflicts. Thus, the 
mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution was geared towards making the organization 
proactive rather than reactive to conflicts occurring within the region. With the unstable nature 
of security in Ivory Coast prior to the elections and especially due to the lackadaisical approach 
of the warring factions towards disarming, ECOWAS should have anticipated the possibility 
of recurrence of violence in the country. Post-election violence is not a new phenomenon in 
African politics. According to the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) and the Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung (FES), post-election violence occurs between 19% to 25% of all elections held on the 
African continent (Abatan, 2016). With the high level of polarization persisting after the first 
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civil war and the entrenched position of all the contestants towards winning the poll, ECOWAS 
had enough reasons to anticipate the possibility of violence in order to prevent it occurrence.  
However, no preventive measures were put in place to ensure that the regional organization 
could swiftly intervene should the outcome of the results get disputed. Particularly, the crisis 
served as a test for the newly adopted ECPF. As discussed in chapter three, the framework 
provided for the council of the wise to be actively engaged in the mediation of potential 
conflicts. Yet, during the crisis, a greater part of the mediatory role was undertaken by the 
Authority. This study argues that, the council of the wise could have contributed significantly 
towards mediating the conflict since the Authority was divided on the best approach to 
resolving the crisis. Again, since Gbagbo perceived the involvement of the international 
community, especially the UN and France as pursuing imperialist agenda, an Afrocentric 
approach may have been welcomed by him, hence necessitating the need for the council of the 
wise to have been involved in the process. The inability of ECOWAS to successfully resolve 
the crisis therefore reflects the incapacity of the organization to operationalize its robust 
conflict prevention and resolution policies adopted prior to the crisis.    
 5.4.1 Military intervention- desirable but impractical  
Based on article 22 of the Mechanism, the Authority of Heads of State and Government 
requested for the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff to consider the viability of a military 
intervention to depose Gbagbo (Obi, 2011). The meeting of the defence chiefs however 
revealed that a military operation by the standby force ‘was not operationally feasible’(ibid).  
That notwithstanding, most countries within the sub-region vehemently opposed the resort to 
military intervention to end the conflict (Yabi, 2012). Although military intervention had 
become necessary in resolving the impasse, member states of the community had different 
perspectives on the use of force to champion a pro-democracy agenda. This was however to be 
expected as member states of the community rarely arrive at a unanimous decision on military 
interventions, as evidenced in the controversies surrounding the deployment of ECOMOG to 
Liberia.  
Member states that took the anti-military stance argued that a military intervention might cause 
Gbagbo to retaliate by attacking foreign nationals in Abidjan (Kode, 2016). With Cote d’Ivoire 
being home to many West African foreigners, member states of the community were more 
inclined towards preserving their national interest and the security of their nationals. This is a 
reflection of a deep-seated challenge regarding the lack of political will by member states to 
commit entirely to ensuring regional stability. Again, member states feared that the use of force 
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in reconciling electoral disputes may set an undesirable precedence for future military 
intervention in the many contested elections in the sub-region (Odobo, S. O et.al 2016). In view 
of this, some countries preferred the diplomatic approach although it was quite clear that 
Gbagbo was not prepared to willingly yield power if force was not applied.  
Whereas Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Senegal championed the use of force in resolving the 
stalemate, Ghana, Gambia, Togo and Benin took a neutral stand (Watt, 2011). Ghana’s 
president at the time, John Atta Mills, emphatically stated that Accra would not support any 
form of military intervention as it was not the appropriate means to resolve the crisis (Cocks, 
T & Kpodo, K,  2011). This position was influenced by Accra’s quest to ensure the safety of 
its citizens in Cote d’Ivoire as well as constraints on the military capability of Ghana, hence 
making it impossible for the country to contribute troops towards the ECOWAS standby force 
(ibid). Nigeria on the other hand was confronted with many internal security challenges that it 
was grappling with, especially the Boko Haram insurgency (Cook, 2011). Also, Abuja had an 
upcoming election in 2011 and considering the many unresolved domestic challenges, the use 
of the countries scarce resources and troops to support the intervention would have been 
politically costly to the incumbent government (Doyle, 2010). The unwillingness of Nigeria to 
spearhead ECOWAS’ military intervention in Cote d’Ivoire reaffirms the fact that ECOWAS 
is seemingly unable to perform its role of ensuring peace and security in the sub-region without 
the involvement of the regional leader (Odobo, S. O, etal, 2016).  Significantly, the stance of 
the member states of the region reflects a significant shift in the Anglo-Francophone rivalry 
that always permeated the sub-region’s conflict resolution strategies. However, it reaffirms 
how personal and national interest always takes precedence over sub-regional interest in the 
organizations conflict management efforts.   
Further, with the loyalty of the Armed Forces of Cote d’Ivoire tilted towards Gbagbo, a regional 
intervention risked further escalating the conflict and perhaps prolonging it. In order to avoid 
this, ECOWAS refrained from intervening (El-Khawas, M & Anyu, J, 2014). This reason is 
however not a sufficient explanation for ECOWAS’ inability to deploy troops into Ivory Coast. 
In March 2011, ECOWAS requested for the UN Security Council to strengthen the mandate of 
UNOCI, implying that the organization recognized the need for a military intervention but 
lacked the capacity to adopt that approach. The fundamental reason why ECOWAS refrained 
from deploying troops into Ivory Coast was because it lacked the needed logistical, institutional 
and financial capability to make its intervention successful (Doyle, 2010).  It is in view of this, 
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that ECOWAS had to rely on UNOCI and France to carry out the much-needed military 
intervention that ended the crisis.  
Yabi (2012) and Zoumenou (2011) argue that, the inability of ECOWAS to adhere to the 
organization’s conflict framework that provided for the use of force to oust Gbagbo is an 
embarrassment to the organization. This study however asserts that, such a supposition may be 
true on the surface value. However, considering the complexity of the conflict and the many 
challenges faced by the sub-regional organization, it acted prudently by requesting for the 
UNSC to strengthen the mandate of UNOCI. That notwithstanding, it only reflects the many 
limitations in the institutional capacity of ECOWAS to deal with security challenges emerging 
within the community.    
5.5 Conclusion  
During the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, the regional bloc barely had established 
institutions and structures to address the crisis. This posed a central challenge to the conflict 
management of the organization. However, the post-election crisis in Cote d’Ivoire presented 
a unique set of challenges to the regional organization. Although the option to use force in 
ousting Gbagbo was permissible under the organization’s legal statutes, yet it was not a feasible 
alternative due to ECOWAS’ lack of operational capacity. Unlike previous conflicts in the sub-
region where ECOWAS had been at the forefront of the resolution process, the organization 
had to partner with UNOCI, France and the AU in resolving the Ivorian crisis. Some challenges 
explored in this chapter includes the lack of coordination between ECOWAS and its partners, 
the inability of ECOWAS to operationalize its conflict management policies and the lack of 
consensus on the deployment of the ECOWAS stand-by force.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
Over the past three decades, ECOWAS has been actively involved in maintaining peace and 
security in West Africa. In view of the region’s precarious security conditions, the organization 
has revamped its efforts at stabilizing the community in recent times. After a rather daunting 
and prolonged presence of ECOMOG in Liberia, the sub-regional organization least expected 
that Cote d’Ivoire- the epitome of development and stability in the community- would be 
plunged into conflict. Although ECOWAS could not apply force in Yamoussoukro due to its 
weak military capability at the time, yet, the organization was actively involved in searching 
for a lasting solution to the conflict. This chapter seeks to assess the findings of the research 
vis-à-vis the case studies discussed in the last two chapters. The other sections of the chapter 
will be concerned with recommendations for policy consideration as well as future research.  
6.2 Summary of findings  
The focus of the study has been to evaluate the challenges which undermined ECOWAS’ 
interventions in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire. In this regard, the thesis has not been concerned 
with whether or not the interventions were successful or a failure as these terms are complex 
and subjective, hence the narrow focus on challenges. Analysing the impediments ECOWAS 
was confronted with is significant as it brings to light some challenges that are recurrent in the 
organization’s conflict management efforts. As such, it is evident from the discussions in 
chapter four and five that some challenges encountered by ECOWAS in Liberia did recur in 
Cote d’Ivoire. However, the robust security architecture adopted by the regional organization 
after the intervention in Liberia contributed towards mitigating the challenges the organization 
encountered in Cote d’Ivoire, especially pertaining to the legality of the intervention. It is 
worthy to note that the new impediments emerging from the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire are 
likely to be replicated in future interventions if not adequately redressed by the organization.  
The study reveals that the approach of ECOWAS member states towards conflicts in the sub-
region has changed remarkably with time. In the early 1990’s when ECOWAS was in the 
process of reshaping its scope from being primarily development oriented to embracing its new 
73 
 
role as the leading security actor in the sub-region, member states were actively involved in 
supporting conflicts within the community (Halistoprak, 2015). It is in view of this that 
Taylor’s rebellion in Liberia received support from some West African states, hence 
endangering the initiatives of the regional organization towards resolving the conflict. 
However, this has changed with time. In view of this, the Ivorian conflict was unanimously 
condemned by the community ( El-Khawas, M & Anyu, J, 2014). The twist in response by 
member states reflects the gradual blurring of the Anglo-Francophone tensions which 
previously stifled the organizations conflict management capabilities.   
Again, the dynamics of conflicts within the region has changed remarkably. This is attributable 
to the fact that protracted civil wars are on the decline in West Africa. Despite this, the sub-
region is currently experiencing new security threats emanating from political violence and 
terrorism (Marc et.al, 2017).  As such, the Ivorian crisis marked a new era of conflicts occurring 
within the sub-region. It is in view of this that although the Liberian civil war claimed the lives 
of over 200,000 people, the Ivorian conflict resulted in 3000 casualties (Kieh, 2004). 
Fundamentally, the causes of conflicts in the sub-region have not changed. Poverty, 
unemployment, human rights abuses and the lack of commitment to democratic principles are 
prevalent within the sub-region. However, in both conflicts, the source of contention can be 
attributed to the polarization of the country along ethnic lines. The conflict in Liberia was 
underpinned by the political and economic marginalization of the indigenous people. Similarly, 
the root cause of the first Ivorian civil war which precipitated the post-election conflict pertains 
to the instrumentalization of citizenship as a tool by the political elites to marginalize non-
indigenous Ivorians in the governance process.  
Moreover, the Liberian civil war was precipitated by bad governance which only alluded to the 
benefit of the elite few. The dissatisfaction thereof resulted in citizens supporting the ousting 
of the government (ibid). That notwithstanding, when ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Good 
Governance and Democracy, it reflected the organizations attempt to learn from the Liberian 
experience in order to improve democracy within West Africa. Despite this commitment by 
member states, the consolidation of democracy in the sub-region seem far-fetched. 
Unsurprisingly, the lack of respect for democratic principles resulted in the Ivorian conflict. 
This exhibits a gap between the regional organizations policies and what is practiced in reality. 
Although Gbagbo was a signatory to the Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy, yet 
he refused to step down after losing the election. This is however not uncommon but reflects a 
74 
 
lack of commitment and political will of leaders of member states to adhere to the peace and 
security policies of ECOWAS. 
Similarly, although the PMAD prohibited external interference in the internal affairs of 
member states, Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire aided the NPFL insurrection in Liberia (Brown, 
1999). This portrays a challenge with enforcing the sub-region’s peace and security policies. 
The quintessential issue arising from this is that, the national interest of member states may 
always take precedence over the collective regional interest. This renders it practically difficult 
for member states to reach a consensus on the best approach to resolving conflicts occurring 
within the community, since they all prioritise the benefits they may accrue from supporting 
the organizations intervention efforts over regional peace.  
Further, the capacity of ECOWAS to prevent and manage conflicts in the sub-region is 
overstretched. It is in view of this that the organization could not embark on a military 
intervention in Ivory Coast. It is also as a result of this that the intervention in Liberia was 
fraught with significant challenges that eventually prolonged the conflict (Tuck, 2000). The 
lack of adequate capacity to resolve conflicts usually results in ECOWAS compromising its 
neutrality in order to garner support from belligerents in a conflict. This phenomenon was 
evident in the intervention in Liberia where ECOWAS supported some rebel factions.   
Another evolving development in conflict management in West Africa pertains to the shift in 
the approach of the international community towards conflicts within the sub-region. In recent 
times, West Africa has experienced a surge in the involvement of the international community 
in redressing security threats in the region. Although the UN intervened in the Liberian civil 
war, yet the organization only did so after ECOWAS had initiated diplomatic measures to end 
the conflict and deployed a peacekeeping mission to Monrovia (Adibe, 1997). This allowed 
ECOWAS to develop an Afrocentric approach towards resolving the conflict and also afforded 
the sub-regional organization the opportunity to take ownership of peace and stability within 
the region. Contrary to this, the resolution of the Ivorian civil war was dominated by the UN 
and France and to some extent the AU (Zounmenou, 2011). Although the role of these 
organizations in the conflict resolution process was significant in containing and ending the 
conflict, yet, it further complicated the conflict and stifled ECOWAS’ engagement in the crisis. 
It is therefore imperative that ECOWAS develops a clear-cut strategy that delineates the role 
of international actors in conflicts occurring within West Africa.  
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Furthermore, the approach of ECOWAS towards the two conflicts differed in many respects. 
Upon the eruption of the Liberian civil war, it took ECOWAS eight months to intervene in the 
conflict. This is understandable as it was the first conflict occurring within the sub-region after 
the establishment of the organization. ECOWAS was also ill-prepared to intervene in the 
conflict (Adeleke, 1995). This can be attributed to the lack of institutional structures to guide 
the organizations efforts. Contrary to this, ECOWAS responded swiftly to the second Ivorian 
civil war. This is attributable to the existence of the ECOWAS peace and security architecture 
that ascribes the responsibility of maintaining regional peace and security to the bloc. It is in 
view of this that the involvement of ECOWAS in Ivory Coast was acceptable within the sub-
region’s legal framework. Whereas the intervention in Liberia was confronted with legal 
challenges based on international law and existing protocols of ECOWAS.  
Also, there are similarities and differences in the challenges encountered by ECOWAS in 
managing both conflicts. Particularly, the controversial role of Nigeria as leader of the 
intervention in Liberia adversely affected the capacity of ECOWAS to mediate the conflict, as 
the organization was perceived as biased (Kennedy, 2018). That notwithstanding, the 
intervention would have failed had Nigeria refrained from taking responsibility for managing 
the conflict. However, with Nigeria lacking the capacity to marshal troops and the needed 
resources to support an ECOWAS intervention in Ivory Coast, the sub-regional bloc only 
pursued diplomatic processes although a military intervention was necessary. As such, 
Nigeria’s role in the maintenance of regional peace cannot be underrated. That 
notwithstanding, Nigeria’s involvement in conflicts within the sub-region is premised on 
Abuja’s efforts at pursuing its national interest (Arowolo, 2015). It is in view of this that 
Abuja’s economic and political ties with Liberia, as well as the many Nigerians trapped in 
Monrovia, influenced the formers decision to intervene. With these conditions not being 
entirely present in Cote d’Ivoire, coupled with Abuja’s domestic challenges, Nigeria was 
demotivated from leading an ECOWAS military intervention.    
Another challenge occurring in both conflicts was the lack of a common approach embraced 
by all member states of the community in resolving the crisis. The strategy adopted by 
ECOWAS in resolving the conflicts was influenced by the stance of the member states of the 
community. In both conflicts, the various leaders of the community were divided along the 
lines of those who favoured military intervention as well as the anti-interventionist. This 
reflects the lack of consensus among member states on the best approach to managing conflicts 
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within the sub-region. This usually hinders ECOWAS’ capacity to respond promptly to 
emerging conflicts within the sub-region. 
Further, the interventions in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire reflects ECOWAS’ lack of capacity to 
unilaterally intervene and resolve conflicts in the sub-region. Unarguably, ECOWAS has 
demonstrated its willingness to prevent, manage and address the root causes of conflicts in the 
region. However, due to the lack of capacity in terms of finance, logistics and institutional 
structures, ECOWAS usually relies on other intergovernmental organizations and states for 
assistance. This is due to the poor economic conditions of member states, hence making it 
difficult for them to contribute towards ECOWAS’ conflict management operations. This 
challenge stifled the response of the sub-regional grouping especially in the Ivorian crisis where 
it lacked the capacity to deploy troops into the country (Yabi, 2012). The lack of funds and 
logistics was also evident in the Liberian civil war, where some contingents went months 
without salaries, hence resulting in corruption and malpractices among some troops (Tarr, 
1993). 
6.3 Recommendations for policy consideration 
Despite the enormous efforts of ECOWAS to stabilize the region, conflicts continue to recur 
within West Africa. That notwithstanding, ECOWAS has demonstrated the potential to create 
a conducive environment needed to enhance its vision of promoting economic integration and 
development. A stable West Africa is however unattainable if ECOWAS is unable to redress 
the current challenges its confronted with in managing conflicts within the community. In view 
of this, the study proposes the following: 
1. Most conflicts occurring in West Africa are preventable as the causes of the conflicts 
are known. As such, it is important that the capacity of ECOWARN to identify potential 
triggers of conflicts in West Africa is enhanced. This requires that all member states 
collaborate with the various zonal bureaux and make information readily available to 
improve the efficiency of the institution in preventing conflicts. Also, ECOWARN and 
other institutions responsible for conflict prevention must be adequately resourced as it 
is less costly preventing conflicts than managing them.  
2. ECOWAS must endeavour to improve its mediatory efforts in order to erase the 
perception of bias affiliated with the organizations conflict management operations. 
This requires the training of mediators to enhance their understanding of the conflicts 
they intervene in. Mediators appointed by the organization should also be people of 
integrity and suitable for the particular conflict situation they are called to mediate. In 
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this regard, ECOWAS must endeavour to be neutral and objective in its response to 
conflicts in the sub-region. 
3. Rather than dispatching troops for peacekeeping operations in West Africa, the UN, 
AU and other state actors must endeavour to support the ECOWAS Standby force. 
Since ECOWAS is in a better position to dispatch troops to member states within the 
shortest possible time, it is relevant that the later provides logistical and financial 
support to aid peacekeeping operations in the sub-region instead of mobilizing troops 
for military intervention. This collaboration will enhance the capacity of ECOWAS in 
managing conflicts in the sub-region while contributing towards UN’s vision of 
ensuring international peace and security. The UN and AU should however remain 
involved in mediating conflicts in the sub-region. This will resolve the challenge arising 
from overlapping roles of external actors in conflicts occurring in the sub-region. 
4. In order to ensure timely military interventions, it is necessary that the capability of the 
ECOWAS Standby Force is enhanced. This require that the multinational force is 
equipped in terms of logistics and funds. In achieving this, the regional organization 
should create a special fund to support its peacekeeping operations. Member states must 
endeavour to contribute financially towards this end. Further, there must be a 
monitoring mechanism in place to evaluate the activities of troops dispatched by 
ECOWAS. This will ensure that military personnel act according to the ethical 
standards of their profession and do not engage in human right abuses and other 
malpractices.    
5. Again, the ECOWAS Commission must periodically assess the performance of the 
organization after every intervention. This will enhance the capacity of the organization 
to learn from its interventions.  
6. Further, ECOWAS must continue to support its member states in their democratization 
and development process. This requires that the current focus on election monitoring is 
broadened to include a focus on human rights, rule of law, equitable distribution of 
resources and youth empowerment among others. This should be done, albeit, within 
the existing legal framework of the organization in order not to undermine the 
sovereignty of member states.   
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6.4 Recommendations for future research 
The study was focused on evaluating the impediments encountered by ECOWAS in its 
conflict management in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire. The study however identifies that there 
is a gap in the literature on ECOWAS’ peacebuilding initiatives in West Africa. As such, 
it is crucial that future studies focus on the best approach the sub-regional organization can 
adopt in order to achieve positive peace after the organization ends its peacekeeping 
operations. Studies on ECOWAS’ peacebuilding efforts have become increasingly 
necessary due to the high risk of recurrence of conflicts in most countries experiencing civil 
wars in West Africa. A case in point is Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and the ongoing turmoil in 
Mali. In this regard, future studies on the role of ECOWAS in ensuring an Afrocentric 
peacebuilding is relevant in bridging the existing gap in literature. Such a study will 
contribute towards preventing countries that have experienced conflicts in West Africa 
from relapsing into war. 
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